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The growing evidence of Chinese government complicity in commercial cyber espionage 
and theft of intellectual property, costing the United States billions of dollars, has blurred 
the distinction between the geopolitical and economic realms, complicating an already 
complex relationship. Yet, China’s cyber activity takes place in the context of an 
extensive economic interdependence between the two countries that may be seen as a 
source of stability in the relationship. Taking into consideration the economic 
interdependence between the United States and China, the rise of China as a potential 
global power, and the threat of state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, the major 
question driving this thesis is: What does China’s cyber behavior tell us about the role of 
economic interdependence in U.S.-China relations? This thesis applies the complex 
interdependence framework to demonstrate that China has systematically conducted 
cyber-enabled economic espionage against the United States in an effort to shift the 
economic balance of power. Furthermore, this thesis shows China’s ability to use 
asymmetric interdependence as a source of power and instrument of political coercion 
and prove its willingness to use these instruments against the United States. Finally, this 
thesis reasons that if China continues its persistent cyber espionage campaign, it would 
indicate that the potential costs of its cyber programs outweigh the benefits of its 
relationship with the United States.  
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In an environment of greater global economic interdependence, astounding 
technological advancement, the challenge of U.S. hegemony with the rise of new global 
superpowers, and the ease with which conflict and war can and have been waged, the 
nature of interstate relationships has never been more important. While U.S-China 
economic ties have significantly increased over the past three decades, the bilateral 
relationship continues to be riddled with complexities, friction, and tension. The growing 
evidence of Chinese government complicity in commercial cyber espionage and theft of 
intellectual property (IP), costing the United States billions of dollars, has blurred the 
distinction between the geopolitical and economic realms, further complicating the 
relationship. 
During bilateral discussions in June 2013, President Barack Obama warned 
Chinese President Xi Jinping that if cyber security issues, such as the theft of U.S. 
property, were not addressed, it would “be a very difficult problem in the economic 
relationship and was going to be an inhibitor to the relationship really reaching its full 
potential.”1 The possibility of this distrust spilling over into other areas of U.S.-China 
relations is a major concern that could determine whether the relationship becomes one of 
cooperation or more adversarial in nature.2 “Distrust of each other’s actions in the cyber 
realm is growing between the U.S. and China,” according to Kenneth Lieberthal and 
Peter Singer, political scientists and senior fellows at Brookings Institute.3 The effect of 
cyber security on other aspects of the U.S.-China relationship is more important than with 
any other bilateral relationship because of the emerging world order and potential 
challenge to U.S. hegemony.  
                                                 
1 Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues, (CRS Report No. RL33536) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2014), 1, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf.  
2 Ibid., 6.   
3 Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter W. Singer, Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institute, 2012), 6, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2012/2/23%20cybersecurity%20china%20us%2
0singer%20lieberthal/0223_cybersecurity_china_us_lieberthal_singer_pdf_english.PDF.   
 2 
China is believed to have engaged in cyber espionage and intelligence collection 
as far back as 2004 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated 
intrusions, code-named Titan Rain, by Chinese hackers against U.S. military labs.4 In 
2012, computer networks and systems around the world continued to be targets of 
intrusions and data theft, many of which originated in China and were attributable 
directly to the Chinese government and military.5 Though it would seem that China took 
a step in the direction of cooperation by agreeing in a 2013 United Nations report that 
international law does extend to cyberspace, there are no indications that China’s cyber 
espionage and the theft of IP against the United States has waned.6  
China’s cyber activity against the United States takes place in the context of an 
extensive economic interdependence between the two countries that could be seen as a 
source of accommodation and stability in the relationship. Taking into consideration the 
economic interdependence between the United States and China, the rise of China as a 
potential global power, and the threat of state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, the 
major question driving this thesis is: What does China’s cyber behavior tell us about the 
role of economic interdependence in U.S.-China relations?  Other aspects of this question 
include: Is China’s current use of cyberspace intended to shift the symmetry within U.S.-
China economic interdependence and create a source of power for China? Does the use of 
cyberspace strengthen or weaken China’s position within the U.S-China relationship? 
How has China’s cyber behavior been shaped by U.S.-China interdependence?  
A. CHINA’S EMERGING ECONOMY 
Economists agree that there is no emerging economy more important than China 
to the health of the global economy and that China will face difficult challenges that will 
                                                 
4 Timothy Thomas, “Google Confronts China’s ‘Three Warfares,’” Parameters (Summer 2010): 102. 
5 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 37, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.  
6 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Report to Congress 
(Washington, DC:,Government Printing Office, 2013), 249, http://www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2013-
annual-report-congress. 
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require both economic and political change.7 Where economists diverge is in predicting 
whether China can maintain the significant growth seen of the last three decades to 
surpass the United States as the largest global economy and what that means for the 
global power structure. “The next 40 years may see one of the greatest shifts in economic 
and military power in history,” according to Uri Dadush, an author and economist with 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.8  
By 2050, the world’s three largest economies will be the United States, China, 
and India.9 This shift in economic power will significantly affect global economic 
governance and regional and global interstate relationships. However, “distortive 
economic policies that have resulted in over-reliance on fixed investment and exports for 
economic growth (rather than on consumer demand), government support for state-
owned firms, a weak banking system, widening income gaps, growing pollution, and the 
relative lack of the rule of law in China” have been identified as potential weak points in 
China’s economic development, according to a U.S. Congressional Research Service 
report.10 Predicting the economic growth or potential for any nation is difficult, but for 
China, it is especially difficult with the significant economic reforms identified in the 
country’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP).  
B. CYBER REVOLUTION 
Similar to the degree of difficulty in predicting the economic growth of China, 
forecasting and analyzing China’s behavior in cyberspace is equally problematic. There is 
no space more unpredictable than cyberspace, yet states are becoming increasingly 
dependent on information technology to drive political and economic development. The 
United States and China are two of the major players in cyberspace, but they hold vastly 
                                                 
7 Robert E. Looney, Handbook of Emerging Economies, ed. Robert E. Looney (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2014), 5. 
8 Uri Dadush, “Key Trends in the World Economy” in Handbook of Emerging Economies, ed. Robert 
E. Looney (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 26. 
9 Ibid., 16, 21. 
10 Wayne M. Morrison, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the 
United States (CRS Report No. RL33534) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 1–2, 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf.  
 4 
different views on acceptable behavior in the cyber domain. Even among close allies, 
there is little consensus among researchers on what constitutes a cyber attack or the 
threshold for an act of war in cyberspace. James Lewis, author and preeminent expert on 
cyber security, reasons that “an obstacle to managing cyber competition among states is 
the blurred boundaries between cyber-crime, cyber-espionage, and cyber-attack among 
states.”11 The Internet was originally designed for the free flow of information with 
security as an afterthought. “The only distinction between computer network exploitation 
and attack is the intent of the operator at the keyboard,” argues Brian Krekel, author and 
subject matter expert on China.12 
Despite the difficulty in attribution of cyber operations and ability of a nation to 
potentially disguise cyber operations, the interdependence between two nations may be 
enough of a deterrence to prevent a cyber attack. “Even when the source of an attack can 
be successfully disguised under a ‘false flag,’ other governments may find themselves 
sufficiently entangled in interdependent relationships that a major attack would be 
counterproductive. China, for example, would itself lose from an attack that severely 
damaged the American economy, and vice versa,” argues Joseph Nye, Distinguished 
Service Professor at Harvard University and co-founder of complex interdependence 
theory.13 But knowing where these lines are is a serious problem for both the United 
States and China. Offensive cyber operations require a deep knowledge of cultural or 
military sensitivities, potential “red lines,” and how an attack or intrusion will be 
perceived. For instance, China’s government sees Tibetan exiles and Falun Gong hackers 
as national security threats, while the United States sees them as hacktivists advancing 
human rights and Internet freedom. Similarly, U.S. leaders view Twitter and YouTube as 
outlets for personal expression, but their Beijing counterparts identify the websites as 
                                                 
11 James Lewis, Hidden Arena: Cyber Competition and Conflict in Indo-Pacific Asia (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), 2, http://csis.org/publication/hidden-arena-cyber-
competition-and-conflict-indo-pacific-asia.  
12 Bryan Krekel, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and 
Computer Network Exploitation (Falls Church, VA: Northrop Grumman, 2009), 8, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-030.pdf. 
13 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Cyber Power,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 
Kennedy School, May 2010, 16, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf.  
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instruments of attack.14 “Failure to understand an enemy’s potential ‘red lines’ can lead 
to unintentional escalation of the conflict,” states Krekel.15  
In addition, cyberspace represents a domain in which a nation’s economic, 
political, and military capabilities and vulnerabilities converge. “The Internet thus may 
have no formal state borders, but it is increasingly a place that state entities both operate 
in and care deeply about,” affirm Lieberthal and Singer.16 IP, sensitive source code, 
proprietary data, business records, research and development, sensitive economic 
information, and advanced technology all exist in digital medium, enabling foreign actors 
to quickly gather massive quantities of data with little risk. The most important change 
facilitating economic espionage through cyberspace, or cyber-enabled economic 
espionage, is the sheer quantity of data produced digitally and stored electronically. With 
China’s long-term economic growth and prosperity riding on technological innovation, 
China’s actions in cyberspace will be a major factor in determining future U.S.-China 
political and economic relations, as well as whether the rise of China as a regional 
hegemon will be peaceful.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Work for this thesis draws on and conjoins four distinct areas of prior research: 
the role of economic interdependence in the relationships of states, the “rise of China” 
and how China’s rise is shaping U.S.-China relations, and the impact of cyber 
technologies on such relationships. 
1. Economic Interdependence, War, and Peace 
Understanding International Relations (IR) theory is key to understanding the 
nature of the changing relations between nation states, and there is no relationship more 
important to the international system than the relationship between the United States and 
China. As China continues its rise, the United States struggles with how to address 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 18.  
15 Krekel, Capability of the People’s Republic of China, 21.  
16 Lieberthal and Singer, Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations, 6.  
 6 
China’s emergence as a potential great power. Each school of thought provides a 
different perspective on China’s rise and what it means for U.S.-China relations. From 
one perspective, the economic interdependence between the United States and China 
makes conflict impractical.17 From another perspective, there is a real likelihood that the 
United States and China will engage in an intense security competition that could very 
well lead to conflict.18 While this literature review will examine a number of IR 
perspectives, the complex interdependence framework, seen as an integration of realist 
and liberal thought, is the framework used throughout this thesis.  
In The Great Illusion, originally published in 1909, Norman Angell disputes the 
idea that nations could gain from war, conquest, or armed conflict.19 Rather than bringing 
profit or other advantages, Angell argues that the prevailing economic interdependence 
between industrial countries made war obsolete in the 20th century, since even military 
victors lose far more than they gain.20 This proposition became an article of faith among 
policy- and opinion-makers of the age, and informed the heady promises that the “boys” 
who marched into the battles brewing in Europe in August 1914 would “be home by 
Christmas” that year. When instead, World War I wore on for several years, expending 
the blood and treasure of the leading western powers in unprecedented measure, critics 
lambasted Angell and his argument. The critics missed a key point, however: Angell did 
not say war was impossible but rather that the economic consequences would devastate 
the participants.21  
Some observers believe that Angell’s principle—of economic prowess inhibiting 
all-out military conflict—operates in China today. Thomas Friedman advanced a position 
similar to Angell, arguing that “to the extent that countries tied their economies and 
futures to global integration and trade, it would act as a restraint on going to war with 
their neighbors. As countries got woven into the fabric of global trade and rising living 
                                                 
17 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York and London: Garland Publishing: 1972), 54–55.    
18 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History (April 2006): 160–161, 
http://www.currenthistory.com/pdf_org_files/105_690_160.pdf.   
19 Angell, The Great Illusion, 27.    
20 Ibid.    
21 Ibid., 54–55. 
 7 
standards, the cost of war for victor and vanquished became prohibitively high.”22 
Friedman believes that China’s push toward a more free-market economy is in the best 
interest of the United States and of the world. Political upheaval or a potential war could 
devastate economic progress, risk a state’s place in the global supply chain, and ruin 
business credibility. He contends that countries intertwined in global supply chains will 
have to carefully consider engaging in anything but a war of self-defense.23 
Kenneth Waltz argues the contrary by stating that the structure of the international 
system limits cooperation and forces states to compete in order to ensure survival: “States 
do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help 
system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.”24  
Furthermore, states seek to maximize their relative power in order to ensure their own 
survival and “because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be 
ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness.”25 Waltz states 
that “in the end, power will balance power, and there isn’t any doubt that the Chinese are 
very uncomfortable with the extent to which the United States dominates the world 
militarily. But China, if it maintains its political coherence, its political capabilities will 
have in due course the economic and the technological means of competing.”26 While 
countries have always competed for security, it has often led to conflict. The world is 
witnessing what Waltz describes as “the all-but-inevitable movement from unipolarity to 
multipolarity” in Asia as China emerges as a great power.27  
John Mearsheimer reiterates this point when he states that “the ultimate goal of 
every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the 
                                                 
22 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Picador, 2007), 586.   
23 Ibid., 587. 
24 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979), 107.  
25 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), 160. 
26 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Conversations with History: Conversation with Kenneth Waltz,” Institute of 
International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, February 10, 2003, 5, 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Waltz/waltz-con5.html.   
27 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 
32, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf. 
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system.”28 He writes that “the best way to survive in the international system is to be as 
powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals.”29 Great powers don’t only strive to be 
the strongest power but to be the only great power in the system and prevent others from 
accomplishing the same. This type of intense security competition has the potential to 
lead to conflict or war.30 Mearsheimer states, “China cannot rise peacefully, and if it 
continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and 
China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential 
for war.”31  
2. The Rise of China and U.S.-China Relationship 
It is no secret that China has developed into a major global economic and trade 
power over the last three decades. While many experts expect that China will surpass the 
United States as the world’s largest economy, others argue that  China’s ability to 
maintain the rapid economic growth it has seen over the past decade will depend on 
whether it implements comprehensive economic reforms and completes the transition to a 
free market economy.
32
 Uri Dadush contends that China will overtake the United States 
as the world’s largest economic power to become a global economic leader. Even under a 
lower-growth scenario, China will emerge as one of the three largest economies in the 
world. Although it will remain smaller than the United States in dollar terms, it will 
surpass the purchasing power parity (PPP) gross domestic product (GDP) of the United 
States to become the largest in the world by 2050.33 The World Bank affirms this 
position, stating that China’s economic performance over the last three decades has been 
impressive: “Even if China grows a third as slowly in the future compared with its past 
(6.6 percent a year on average compared with 9.9 percent over the past 30 years), it will 
                                                 
28 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History (April 2006): 160, 
http://www.currenthistory.com/pdf_org_files/105_690_160.pdf.   
29 Zbigniew Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy, no. 146 
(January/February 2005): 48. 
30 Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” 160–161. 
31 Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” 47. 
32 Morrison, China’s Economic Rise, Summary page. 
33 Dadush, “Key Trends in the World Economy,” 13, 28. 
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become a high-income country sometime before 2030 and outstrip the United States in 
economic size (its per capita income, however, will still be a fraction of that in advanced 
countries).”34  
On the contrary, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper in January 2014 
shows a continued decline in China’s growth since 2007 despite high levels of investment 
and credit growth. The authors contend that these factors “would imply diminishing 
returns to investment, a misallocation of resources, and a limit to how far an economy 
can grow by reallocating labor from the country side into factories,” and suggest 
significant reform implementation is needed.35 Wayne Morrison makes the same 
assessment claiming that China’s ability to maintain the rapid economic growth it has 
seen over the past decade will depend on the implementation of comprehensive economic 
reforms and completion of the transition to a free market economy.36 Although Friedman 
argues that China has the potential to become a free-market version of the United States, 
without implementation of a standard rule of law, free press, and a more open political 
system that allows people to vent their grievances, China will never become efficient, 
eradicate corruption, nor be capable of coping with the inevitable downturns in its 
economy.37  
3. Strategic Questions of the U.S.-China Relationship 
One aspect of Chinese economic rise that seems to be clear is the growing trade 
relationship between the United States and China and “sharp expansion in U.S.-China 
commercial ties” since its entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.38 
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What is relatively unclear among experts is whether the relationship will remain 
cooperative and peaceful or end in eventual conflict.39 
In 2011, both the United States and China committed to building a more 
cooperative partnership and a military-to-military relationship in an effort to encourage 
China’s cooperation in the international forum and as a responsible power.40 In a visit to 
China in February 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry spoke about the U.S. and China’s 
relationship as having great potential and a partnership that can come together to build 
stability and prosperity in the region. Secretary Kerry reiterated the commitment to a 
bilateral relationship based on “practical cooperation” and “constructive management of 
differences.”41 Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) contends that 
China’s priorities for the early 21st century are economic growth and development, 
maintaining peace and stability in the region, expanding their influence to access new 
markets and resources, and avoiding direct confrontation with the United States and other 
nations.42  
Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that China is “determined to sustain economic 
growth” and that a “confrontational foreign policy could disrupt that growth, harm 
hundreds of millions of Chinese, and threaten the Communist Party’s hold on power.”43 
A position that China confirmed in a December 2012 essay, when State Councilor of 
China Dai Bingguo wrote: “The notion that China wants to replace the United States and 
dominate the world is a myth.”44 Brzezinski posits that the leadership in China is 
conscious of its strengths but also of its weaknesses: “In a conflict, Chinese maritime 
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2013): 20, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/winter_13/2013winter-Lowther.pdf.    
40 John Kerry, Solo Press Availability in Beijing, China (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2014), 
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41 Ibid.  
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trade would stop entirely. The flow of oil would cease, and the Chinese economy would 
be paralyzed.”45 
In contrast, Mearsheimer argues against the conjecture that China’s desire for 
continued economic growth makes conflict with the United States unlikely: “One of the 
principle reasons that China has been so successful economically over the past 20 years is 
that it has not picked a fight with the United States.”46 Both the German and Japanese 
economies were growing strongly prior to World War II, but Hitler still started World 
War II and Japan started conflict in Asia, combatting the idea that economic strength 
predominates all else or that economic interdependence will restrain states from engaging 
in war.47  
Many U.S. policymakers and senior leaders have similar concerns. Michael 
Schuman argues that while the rise of China is good for the global economy, it concerns 
the United States in the same way that Japan’s economic might did back in the 1980s.48 
Fear that a competing economic system that challenges U.S. ideals can generate superior 
results. According to Schuman, “China is not just competing with the U.S. in the world 
markets, but offering up an entirely different economic and political system. China is 
succeeding based on ideas that Americans despise.”49  
But possibly the biggest concern for some U.S. policy makers is the increasing 
trade deficit between the United States and China with China having amassed $2.5 
trillion in foreign exchange reserves, $1.3 billion of it in U.S. Treasury securities as of 
2013.50 Adam Lowther, John Geis, Panayotis Yannakogeorgos, and Chad Dacus argue 
that if China faces economic stagnation, Chinese Communist Party leaders could alter 
their behavior to ensure power is maintained.51 They argue that “considering China’s 
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strategic culture and the geopolitical environment, antagonistic actions by the PRC 
toward the United States are more likely to be economic than military.”52  
In 2010, People’s Liberation Army academic advisers called on China to dump 
U.S. Treasuries in retaliation for a proposed arms deal between the United States and 
Taiwan.53 The United States responded that “the ability of China to affect the market for 
U.S. Treasuries, and U.S. financial markets more broadly, is limited.”54 While China held 
$1.17 trillion in U.S. Treasury Securities in 2012 and $1.3 trillion in 2013, China’s 
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities accounted for 11 percent of federal debt held by the 
public, 7.5 percent of total public debt, and only slightly more than 2 percent of total U.S. 
credit market debt in 2012, according to the OSD.55 The report asserts that in the most 
aggressive scenario, China could abruptly dump its holdings of U.S. Treasuries, causing 
short-term market disruptions, decreased secondary market values, and increased interest 
rates—though such a move also would impose significant direct financial losses for itself. 
Thus, “attempting to use U.S. Treasury securities as a coercive tool would have limited 
effect and likely would do more harm to China than to the United States.”56 Still, Lowther 
et al. believe that movement away from the dollar would serve to destabilize U.S. 
hegemony.57  The question, then, is only which economy would suffer more.  
Lowther et al. argue that it is when—not if—China will become the world’s 
largest economy and eventually lead to military superiority.58 “Even with modest 
economic growth (by Chinese standards), a consistent share of its gross domestic product 
devoted to defense spending, and relatively optimistic projections of U.S. defense 
expenditures, China’s military outlays are likely to eclipse U.S. defense spending shortly 
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after 2025.”59 While there is little perceived danger of offensive U.S. military, economic, 
or other policy actions, according to Robert Sutter, China’s emergence as a power in the 
region alarms many regional states.60 As China’s economy grows, so does its military 
strength, making many of its regional neighbors (Australia, South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, 
and Taiwan) nervous.61 Mearsheimer claims that it is unlikely that China will build its 
military force to conquer nations, but rather to gain regional hegemony. “An increasingly 
powerful China is also likely to try to push the United States out of Asia, much the way 
the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere.”62 
Mearsheimer points out that the United States has a historical track record of intolerance 
toward peer competitors: “As it demonstrated in the twentieth century, it is determined to 
remain the world’s only regional hegemon.”63 He reasons that much like the behavior the 
United States displayed toward the Soviets during the cold war, the United States will 
likely look to a policy of containment against China. In addition, China’s neighbors will 
look to the United States to build a coalition of nations aimed at preventing China from 
achieving regional hegemon status.64  
Despite the U.S. and Chinese rhetoric that maintaining peace and stability in the 
Pacific remains a priority for both nations, Lowther et al. believe that the “regular 
employment of ambiguity, disinformation, and secrecy in PRC foreign affairs has left the 
United States and countries throughout Asia reticent to believe that China’s military 
modernization is solely for defensive purposes.”65 Consequently, they maintain that 
many of China’s acquisition and development choices, such as the DF-21D missile 
system, dubbed the “carrier killer,” are subtle indicators that China sees a threat arising 
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from the United States that requires a military modernization program aimed at 
mitigating U.S. strengths.66  
While many experts believe the potential for military conflict remains low, 
China’s military modernization, cyberspace endeavors, weapons proliferation activities, 
and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea in 2012 and East China Sea in 2013 and 
2014 continue to be a concern for the U.S. and regional allies. Daniel Russel, assistant 
secretary of state of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testified that “well over 
half the world’s merchant tonnage flows through the South China Sea, and over 15 
million barrels of oil per day transited the Strait of Malacca last year, with most of it 
continuing onward through the East China Sea to three of the world’s largest 
economies.”67 China’s provocative actions and lack of clarity with respect to territorial 
claims in the region increase tensions, lead to concerns about China’s overall objectives, 
and are a great concern to the United States as a maritime nation, dependent on freedom 
of the seas and unimpeded lawful commerce for economic and security interests.68  
4. The U.S.-China Cyberspace Race 
In spite of perceived aggression and provocation by China, Lowther et al. contend 
that unless there is a serious challenge to China’s core interests, their domestic and 
international political and economic environments will ensure they remain nonaggressive 
in the near term.69 They continue: “Historically, great powers have found it difficult to 
become close friends. At the same time, a non-confrontational relationship is possible and 
preferred by China. Chinese cultural writings place particular importance on avoiding 
direct confrontation, especially with a superior adversary”70 China may very well have 
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identified cyberspace as the mechanism to compete with the United States while avoiding 
direct confrontation.  
According to the OSD, “Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent 
perpetrators of economic espionage. Chinese attempts to collect U.S. technological and 
economic information will continue at a high level and will represent a growing and 
persistent threat to U.S. economic security.”71 In 2013, The U.S. government openly 
accused the Chinese government of directing and executing cyber espionage against U.S. 
diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors in order to “benefit China’s 
defense industry, high technology industries, policymaker interest in U.S. leadership 
thinking on key China issues, and military planners building a picture of U.S. network 
defense networks, logistics, and related military capabilities that could be exploited 
during a crisis.72 In what might be the most significant unclassified analytic report 
released on cyber espionage against the United States, the Mandiant Intelligence Report 
bridged the gap between one of the most persistent Chinese cyber actors and the Chinese 
government, attributing global cyber intrusion victims to the 2nd Bureau of China’s 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA).73  
Krekel asserts China’s cyber exploits are more economic in nature: “China’s 
defense industry is producing new generations of weapon platforms with impressive 
speed and quality, and while these advancements are due to a variety of domestic factors, 
Chinese industrial espionage is providing a source of new technology without the 
necessity of investing time or money to perform research.”74 Lowther et al. support this 
view stating, “China’s rapid rise as an economic power is in part the result of effective 
economic reforms but also of its use of cyberspace to conduct wide-spread state-
sponsored espionage against governmental and industrial targets to ‘catch up’ with 
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advanced nations.”75 Lewis observes that “information technology and cyberspace 
occupy a central position in Chinese politics, strategy, and economic policy.” He submits 
that economic espionage through the use of cyberspace is standard practice in China 
aimed at gaining a military and economic advantage.76  
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye reason that information technology will likely be 
the most important power resource in the next century.77 Nye suggests that “information 
technology is likely to be the most crucial power resource” and “asymmetries in 
information can greatly strengthen the hand of the less vulnerable party.”78 Lewis attests 
to Keohane and Nye’s position by stating, “China uses cyber techniques to redress what it 
sees as an imbalance of power, using cyber espionage to compensate for its technological 
lag and weak national innovation capability, as well as an element of a larger strategy on 
how to gain advantage in any military conflict.”79  
However, China maintains that U.S. allegations are groundless. China continues 
to deny claims of cyber espionage arguing that the anonymity of cyberspace and the lack 
of verifiable technical forensic data make it near impossible to identify China as the 
origin. China’s leadership insists that the “accusation that the Chinese government 
participated in cyber attacks, either in an explicit or inexplicit way, is groundless and 
aims to denigrate China. We [are] firmly opposed to that.”80 China asserts that it has the 
same concerns about cyber security as other nations, claiming to also be subject to 
hacking and online threats: “The Ministry of Public Security has noted that the number of 
cyber attacks on Chinese computers and websites has soared by more than 80 percent 
annually, and, by the raw numbers, China is the world’s largest victim of cyber 
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attacks.”81 Lewis concurs that China is genuinely concerned about the risk of malicious 
cyber activity occurring against large nation states and more importantly, the ability of 
cyberspace to affect policies and political stability in China such as they did in the 
Middle East during the Arab Spring in 2010 when social media became a critical 
component in the social revolutions that occurred in much of the Arab world.82  
Contrary to the denial of allegations of cyber espionage, Chinese professional 
military literature highlights the importance of information superiority to China and its 
military leaders. Major General Wang Pufeng writes that information warfare will 
“control the form and future of war” and that the goal is to use “information superiority to 
achieve greater victories at a smaller cost.”83 Wei Jincheng takes Major General Wang’s 
position one step further by declaring that “the multidimensional, interconnected 
networks on the ground, in the air (or outer space), and under water, as well as terminals, 
modems, and software, are not only instruments, but also weapons.”84 
Despite the diverging theories on China’s cyber activity, Lowther et al. suggest 
that by observing Chinese behavior in cyberspace, the United States can develop an 
accurate sense of the U.S.-China relationship.85 While they look at economic interests 
and activity in cyberspace to determine the direction U.S-China relations may take, even 
identifying China’s use of cyberspace to advance economic power, they fall short of 
identifying what China’s cyber behavior tells us about the role of economic 
interdependence in U.S.-China relations. Keohane and Nye address the economic 
interdependence between the United States and China and the importance of information 
technology as a future source of power, but do not explore how it could affect U.S.-China 
political or economic relations. Stephen Roach dedicates massive amounts of research on 
economic interdependence between the United States and China, but limits his focus to 
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the economic aspect of the relationship, with little attention paid to economic espionage 
or cyberspace as a means to conduct economic espionage. In addition, research exists that 
either independently addresses China’s cyber activity or its economic interdependence, 
failing to establish any predictive relationship between these two variables.  
 As the literature review illustrates, researchers have given extensive attention to 
the role of economic interdependence in international relations, the rise of China as an 
economic power, and the contentiousness of Chinese cyber behavior. This thesis 
examines the intersection of these three topics.   
D. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE  
This thesis applies the complex interdependence framework to demonstrate 
China’s efforts to gain leverage through cyberspace in an effort to shift the balance of 
power within its economic interdependent relationship with the United States. Within the 
structure of complex interdependence, Keohane and Nye argue that the more states 
become economically interconnected, the more states will seek to structure their 
interdependence to achieve joint gains and create asymmetries in order to increase power 
relative to the other state.86 They propose that states try to forge issue linkages by 
creating an asymmetric advantage in one area to overcome a disadvantage in another.87 
Nye argues that “manipulating the asymmetries of interdependence is an important 
dimension of economic power. If both states value the interdependent relationship, the 
state that stands to lose the least possesses a source of power.”88  
Nye asserts that a relationship of interdependence has developed today between 
the United States and China, both vulnerable to the actions of the other: “The 
asymmetries reveal a ‘balance of financial terror’ analogous to the Cold War military 
interdependence (mutually assured destruction) in which the United States and the Soviet 
Union each had the potential to destroy the other in a nuclear exchange but never did.”89  
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He argues that although some analysts believe that China’s impressive success in 
overcoming the financial crisis and its increased holdings of dollars have greatly 
increased its power over the United States, China’s reliance on the United States’ 
economic well-being levels the playing field. While China threatening to sell its dollars 
would cause a shift in the global balance of power and bring the United States to its 
knees, it “might also bring itself to its ankles.”90 Neither the United States nor China is 
willing to break the symmetry of their interdependence, yet both nations continue to 
shape the structure of their market relationship in an attempt to create asymmetrical 
advantages over the other. Nye argues that this type of balance does not guarantee 
stability and it is likely that both nations will seek to reduce their vulnerabilities.91 
This thesis employs the analytic concept of complex interdependence to show that 
China’s use of cyber-enabled economic espionage and cyber theft is used as a mechanism 
to overcome scientific and technological innovation and intellectual property deficits that 
threaten economic stagnation, prevent long-term economic growth, and ensure China’s 
dependence on the United States for sustained economic expansion. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This research examines whether China is using cyberspace as a mechanism to 
create asymmetries in the economic interdependent relationship between the United States 
and China in order to shift the current balance of power. This first chapter established the 
basic framework for further examination of U.S.-China economic interdependence, China’s 
cyber behavior, and the implications for future U.S.-China relations.  
Chapter II examines the economic interdependence that has transpired between 
the United States and China over the last 30 years, resulting in a somewhat symmetrical 
dependence that has enabled both nations to sustain long-term economic growth. This 
chapter provides a historical look at the development of U.S.-Chinese economic 
interdependence followed by a section on how the current economic growth models of 
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each nation have resulted in a symmetrical dependence. The chapter concludes by 
describing how China is attempting to implement an economic rebalancing that will 
ensure long-term economic growth while shifting the balance of power within U.S.-
Chinese economic interdependence. 
Chapter III analyzes Chinese use of cyberspace to conduct economic espionage 
and IP theft in an effort to create an asymmetrical advantage over the United States. This 
chapter provides case studies of Chinese cyber-enabled economic espionage that show 
the pervasiveness of China’s economic espionage and how cyberspace is being used to 
alter the balance of economic power between the United States and China. Additionally, 
this chapter will identify parallels between China’s cyber-enabled economic espionage, 
its Twelfth FYP, and its 2006 National Medium to Long-Term Plan for the Development 
of Science and Technology, 2006–2020 (MLP). 
Taking into consideration the assessments made in Chapters II and III that China 
is using cyberspace as a mechanism to create asymmetries in their economic 
interdependent relationship, Chapter IV examines how China’s cyber economic 
espionage could affect the economic relationship between the United States and China 
and what it may mean for the future of U.S.-China relations.  
It is important to note that this thesis is purposely kept at the unclassified level, 
utilizing only unclassified sources and material. While the primary source material for 
this thesis is unclassified, it is understood that there may be a number of classified 
sources that would add to this research topic. The intent is for this thesis and the 
methodologies used within this thesis to be used as a future framework for additional 
research incorporating materials at higher levels of classification. The source material for 
this thesis consists of U.S. government documents, strategies, and policy as well as 
cybersecurity sources with extensive knowledge and understanding of cyberspace such as 
Mandiant, McAfee, Northrup Grumman, and the Rand Corporation. Although most of the 
source material on China will consist primarily of U.S.-authored literature, translated 
Chinese works, such as Chinese Views of Future Warfare and The Art of War, will be 
used whenever possible.  
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II. U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
Since opening up to foreign trade and investment and implementing free market 
reforms in 1979, China has been among the world’s fastest-growing economies, with real 
annual GDP growth averaging nearly 10 percent through 2013.
92
 In recent years, China 
has emerged as a major global economic and trade power. It is currently the world’s 
second-largest economy, largest trading economy, second largest destination of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), largest manufacturer, and largest holder of foreign exchange 
reserves.93 
Although the economic relationship between the United States and China was 
mutually beneficial at the start, with each nation drawing on the other’s strengths to 
expand economic growth, the connection has its downsides, as well. The United States, 
enabled by China’s surplus capital and low-cost production, has pushed its consumption 
to the max while continuously spending its savings. China, supported by the perpetual 
U.S. demand for Chinese products, has focused solely on its export-led growth, causing 
significant economic imbalances and a “destabilizing surplus in its international current 
account balance.”94 As time goes on, China and the United States need each other more 
than ever to sustain the economic growth each desires, building a symbiotic relationship 
neither is comfortable maintaining. Although both the United States and China continue 
to voice growing concerns over the interdependence that has developed over the previous 
two decades, neither has been able to rebalance the economy enough to create an 
asymmetrical advantage over the other. 
A. THE ROAD TO INTERDEPENDENCE 
The second half of the 20th century was considered by many as the golden age of 
American capitalism. Postwar economic expansion and consumer prosperity from the end 
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of World War II to the early 1970s led to an increased middle-class, upsurge in 
productivity, and steady GDP growth. Sara Burke and Claudio Puty assert: “Spectacular 
conditions of profitability in the system during the Golden Age made it possible to 
redistribute gains from increased productivity back to workers in the form of real wage 
increases. The result was increased middle-class demand, which created a growing 
market for mass-produced goods that is now one of the fundamental features of modern 
industrialized societies.”95 Unable to maintain the post-war economic expansion, 
economic growth began to slow in the late 1960s and by the early 1970s Americans faced 
soaring inflation, collapse of the Bretton Woods system, rising interest rates, a stock 
market crash, and an oil crisis.96 Additionally, the post-World War II reconstruction of 
Japan and Germany and emergence of new centers of manufacturing in Asia in the 1960s 
led many American companies to shift manufacturing and production overseas. Industrial 
cities such as Chicago and Detroit lost more than 50 percent of the manufacturing jobs 
that existed 30 years prior.
97
 Between 1960 and 1980, the number of manufacturing 
workers decreased by 10 percent and by 1975, unemployment rose to 9 percent—levels 
not seen since the Great Depression (see additional information below).
98
 
Despite weakening income growth, increasing trade deficits, and mounting 
national debt, the United States had solidified itself as a consumption-based economy by 
the 1980s. U.S. monetary and fiscal policies encouraged consumer spending by 
identifying new ways to increase purchasing power, allowing Americans to live beyond 
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their means. Personal consumption rose to a record 69 percent of GDP in 2011 from 64 
percent in 1990, the highest of any nation (see Figure 1).99 
 
Figure 1.  U.S. Personal Consumption as percent of GDP: 1960–2011100 
Increased spending combined with weak labor income growth resulted in a 
personal savings rate in 2005 that mirrored the post-World War II low of 2.3 percent, 7 
percent below the norm.101 By 2008, household sector indebtedness swelled to 132 
percent of disposable personal income resulting in a “savings-short U.S. economy.”102 
Financial experts contend that the insatiable spending habits of Americans caused U.S. 
personal savings rates to dip below 50-year averages between 1993 and 2009.103 
Following deregulation in the late 1970s and 1980s, credit became increasingly easier to 
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obtain. Households financed large purchases instead of saving for them, often spending 
more than their real wage earnings. The lack of personal savings and decrease in personal 
net worth was a major contributor to financial market instability leading up to and 
exacerbating the financial crisis that started in 2008 (see Figure 2).104  
 
Figure 2.  U.S. Personal Savings Rate: 1959–2009 (percent)105 
Seeking ways to increase growth with stagnant labor income generation, the 
United States “aggressively borrowed surplus savings from abroad, running massive 
current account and foreign trade deficits.”106 In 2011, the United States accounted for 17 
percent of global consumer demand, spending $10.7 trillion on personal consumption. 
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The United States accounts for only 4.5 percent of the world’s population, but U.S. 
consumption is 35 percent larger than pan-European consumption and four times Chinese 
and Indian combined consumption.107 With U.S. consumers, businesses, and government 
spending well beyond U.S. export income and an inability to draw on domestic savings, 
the United States turned to savings from abroad to fund excess spending. The United 
States has run a balance of payments deficit almost every year since 1982, with a deficit 
in 2013 of $379 billion—approximately $295 billion more than the world’s second-
largest deficit, held by the United Kingdom.108 The tremendous disparity between the 
United States and other top current account balance holders appears in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  Balance of Payment Statistics (US $ millions): 2010–2013109 
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Economist and Yale lecturer Stephen Roach argues that “an economy as large as 
America’s with an outsize savings shortfall must run trade deficits with many countries in 
order to secure the incremental funding it needs to maintain economic growth.”110 In 
essence, lack of savings and excess spending by the United States resulting in substantial 
trade and current account deficits and reliance on foreign investment, has ultimately led 
to the development of an economic interdependent relationship with China.   
The history of China’s economic growth is vastly different. After the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong adopted 
a Soviet economic model that incorporated a series of five-year economic plans aimed at 
Chinese socialist industrialization based on the self-sufficiency of Chinese producers and 
consumers (see additional information below).111 Unfortunately, the 1950s through the 
1970s in China were fraught with major economic recessions as a result of unrealistic 
development ambitions and political upheaval during the first four five-year economic 
plans. The First and Second FYPs resulted in a drop in national income from 21.3 percent 
in 1952 to 8.3 percent in 1957.112 The Great Leap Forward implemented by Chairman 
Mao from 1958 to 1960 during the Second FYP, was an economic campaign designed to 
transform China from an agrarian economy into an industrialized communist society that 
resulted in mass famine and took the lives of approximately 40 million people.113 China’s 
Third and Fourth FYPs fared just as poorly because of the political chaos that arose 
during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Although China’s economic policies 
and basic economic model remained the same during this period, the political and social 
                                                 
110 Roach, Unbalanced, 129. 
111 Thomas R. Gottschang, “A Country Study: China,” Library of Congress, Library of Congress Call 
Number DS706 .C489 1988, Chapter 5, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cntoc.html#cn0149. Under Communist 
Party of China (CPC) leadership, Chairman Mao Zedong adopted the Soviet economic model of rapid 
industrial growth and socialization. China’s economic development plans were manifested in a series of 
Five-Year Plans (FYPs) aimed at achieving high rates of economic growth through industrial development. 
China’s five-year economic plans continue to be a detailed outline for the country’s economic goals for a 
given five-year period, aligning China’s economy with government policy goals. The FYPs are broken 
down as follows: First FYP (1953–1957), Second FYP (1958–1962), Third FYP (1966–1970), Fourth FYP 
(1971–1975), Fifth FYP (1976–1980), Sixth FYP (1981–1985), Seventh FYP (1986–1990), Eighth FYP 
(1991–1995) , Ninth FYP (1996–2000), Tenth FYP (2001–2005), Eleventh FYP (2006–2010), Twelfth 
FYP (2011–2015). 
112 Roach, Unbalanced, 12–13. 
113 Roach, Unbalanced, 12–13 and Morrison, China’s Economic Rise, 3. 
 27 
instability that ensued had negative long-term effects on the economy. Production halts, 
extensive disruption of transportation to support the Red Guards, curtailment of foreign 
equipment imports required for technological advancement, and a critical shortage of 
highly educated personnel due to the closing of universities and demotion or 
imprisonment of technical experts led to a 14 percent decrease in industrial production by 
1967.114  
While the FYP framework has been a mainstay of Chinese economic policy, 
Deng Xiaoping led China from a Soviet-style economy to a socialist market economy in 
the 1980s in an effort to develop growth by opening the nation to the forces of market 
competition. From 1979 to 2007, China’s “opening up” led to a rise in exports and large-
scale fixed investment from 31 percent to 75 percent of the GDP, surging China’s real 
GDP an average of 10 percent annually between 1979 and 2013 (see Figure 4).115 
 
Figure 4.  Chinese Real GDP Growth: 1979–2013 (percent)116 
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Exports alone increased from 5 percent of GDP to 36 percent from 1979 to 2007, 
while internal consumption dropped from 50 percent to 35 percent during the same 
period. The steep drop in consumption and diminishing import demand was driven 
largely by economic policies that encouraged high savings rates and favored export-
oriented industries.117 Because China lacked the ability to generate growth internally, it 
became heavily dependent on production and exports to sustain its phenomenal economic 
growth.118 Although China has pushed to modernize its economy through major 
economic reforms in the Eleventh and Twelfth FYPs, a continued overdependence on 
exports and fixed investment and sharp decline in private consumption was evident 
through 2013 (see Figure 5).   
 
Figure 5.  Chinese Gross Savings, Gross Fixed Investment, and Private 
Consumption as a Percent of GDP: 1990–2013 (percent)119 
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“Just as the world has never seen a consumer like the American consumer, it has 
never seen a producer like China,” posits Roach.120 He argues that a marriage of 
convenience has occurred with the ever-increasing consumer demand of the United States 
and a never-ending supply of goods and surplus savings offered by China.121 While 
neither nation intended to develop the interdependence that has occurred between both 
economies, disestablishing the relationship would require long-term economic 
restructuring for both nations.122  
B. ALMOST PERFECT SYMMETRY 
China’s unprecedented economic growth and performance over the last three 
decades has increased the importance of its role in the world economy and transformed it 
into a global economic power, but China’s growth remains dependent on U.S. economic 
strength and health. Likewise, U.S. reliance on Chinese foreign investments to fund 
budget deficits is equally dependent on China’s economic well-being. Though Nye 
argues that perfect symmetry in an interdependent relationship is quite rare because 
“most cases of economic interdependence also involve a potential power relationship,” 
the United States and China appear to have unintentionally achieved a nearly equivalent 
economic dependence, such that neither nation has accrued a particular power advantage 
over the other.
123
 With economic strength as a dominant source of state power, the 
current economic interdependent relationship between the United States and China has 
been fraught with tension, yet sustained to ensure continued economic growth.    
Most economists agree that China’s economy will continue to grow over the next 
15–20 years; however, there is little consensus on the rate of China’s growth or when it 
will rival the United States as the world’s largest economy.124 Estimating the actual size 
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of China’s economy is a major debate among economists and is dependent on how GDP 
and GDP per capita are measured. For instance, in 2013, China’s nominal GDP was $9.4 
trillion, 56 percent the size of the of the U.S. nominal GDP of $16.8 trillion.
125
 However, 
because the PPP basis increases the estimated measurement of China’s economy, when 
looking at China’s GDP for 2013 on a PPP basis, China’s GDP increases to $13.6 trillion, 
making it 81 percent the size of the U.S. economy and significantly closer to reaching 
parity with the U.S. economy (see Table 1 and additional information on PPP below).126 
Despite the significant jump in GDP from nominal to PPP, per capita GDP paints a much 
starker picture for China when comparing economies. Even with a per capita increase 
from $6,960 to $10,060, China was still only 19 percent of the U.S. level and relatively 
poor in per capita terms (see Table 1).127  
Table 1.   Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. GDP and Per Capita GDP in Nominal 
U.S. Dollars and a Purchasing Power Parity Basis: 2013128 
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Although some analysts project that China may overtake the United States as the 
world’s largest economy on a PPP basis as early as 2015, it will take years for its living 
standards to catch up to the United States (see additional information below).129 China’s 
PPP position may be used to improve its global economic stature and decision-making 
power within financial organizations like the IMF, but “China can’t buy missiles and 
ships and iPhones and German cars in PPP currency,” contends Tom Wright.130 Even as 
the second-largest world economy on a PPP basis, China ranked 99th on a per capita 
basis and contributed half as much as the United States to the world GDP in 2011 (see 
Table 2). With China’s real GDP growth projected to slow significantly and U.S. real 
GDP growth projected to maintain its current trajectory, it would be approximately 2030 
before China truly challenges the United States as the world’s largest economic power 
(see Figure 6).  
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Table 2.   Twelve Largest Economies by Share of World GDP: 2011131 
 
 
Figure 6.  Projections of U.S. and Chinese Real GDP Growth Rates: 
2014–2030132 
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While bilateral tensions continue to grow over the current economic relationship, 
each equally encourages unsustainable monetary and fiscal policies. In the United States, 
despite an increase in personal savings rates since 2007, significant government budget 
deficits have slowed any real growth in U.S. savings. With the U.S. net national savings 
rate of only 1.4 percent of gross national income in the first quarter of 2014, the U.S. 
economy remains dependent on foreign capital inflows from China to fund the federal 
budget deficit, meet domestic investment needs, and keep U.S. real interest rates low.133 
Equally reliant on foreign capital, China’s sizeable current account surpluses and an 
exchange rate policy that limits appreciation of Chinese currency—renminbi (RMB)—
has led China to accumulate $3.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, 70 percent of 
which are estimated to be dollar holdings.134 By 2013, the United States was the world’s 
largest importer of foreign capital and China was the second largest exporter of foreign 
capital (see Figure 7).135 
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Figure 7.  Major Net Exporters and Importers of Foreign Capital in 2013136
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Decades of budget deficits and savings shortfalls in the United States have led 
private holdings of U.S. public debt to soar to $12.3 trillion in 2013, with 47 percent 
($5.8 trillion) held by foreign private investors (see Table 3).137 Of that 47 percent, China 
held 21.9 percent of all foreign holdings in U.S. federal debt totaling $1.3 trillion by the 
end of 2013 (see Table 4).138 
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According to Wayne Morrison and Marc Labonte, “rather than hold dollars (and 
other foreign currencies), which earn no interest, the Chinese central government has 
converted some level of its foreign exchange reserve holdings into U.S. financial 
securities, including U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. agency debt, U.S. corporate debt, and 
U.S. equities.”141 With U.S. Treasury securities as the main mechanism for the U.S. 
government to finance the federal debt and the largest category of U.S. securities, foreign 
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities grew to $5.6 trillion by June 2013. China alone held 
$1.3 trillion of that $5.6 trillion in U.S. Treasury securities (see Table 5). This substantial 
amount accounts for 22.8 percent of total foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities 
(see Table 6).142 
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Table 5.   China’s Year-End Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities: 2003–








Although a number of U.S. policymakers have raised concerns over the U.S. 
dependency on China to help fund the U.S. budget deficit through purchase of U.S. 
securities, the ability to borrow from China keeps U.S. interest rates low, increases 
private investment, and prevents GDP stagnation. In 2010 and 2011, the U.S. Congress 
attempted to enact trade sanctions against China to counter its alleged currency 
manipulation, failing to understand that the steep tariffs placed on goods from China 
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could backfire on the United States by raising the costs of U.S. imports, rapidly 
depreciating the dollar’s value, and causing interest rates to soar.145 Simply put by 
Labonte and Nagel, “foreign purchases of Treasury securities reduce the federal 
government’s borrowing costs and reduce the costs the deficit imposes on the broader 
economy.”146 The problem for the United States is not foreign holdings of U.S. debt, but 
rather massive and sustained deficits. According to Derek Scissors, the longer the United 
States maintains enormous budget deficits, “the more likely it is that U.S. treasuries will 
become relatively less attractive, thereby tipping the balance of influence toward 
China.”147 
China has also voiced concerns over the growing economic interdependence and 
the safety of its large accumulation of U.S. debt.148 Morrison and Labonte write: 
“Chinese officials have criticized U.S. fiscal and monetary policies, such as quantitative 
easing by the U.S. Federal Reserve, arguing that they could lead to higher U.S. inflation 
and/or a significant weakening of the dollar, which could reduce the value of China’s 
U.S. debt holdings in the future.”149 Despite China’s apprehensions, U.S. securities 
continue to be its investment of choice for a number of reasons: U.S. securities are 
considered to be safe and liquid compared to other types of investments; interest and 
principal payments are guaranteed and backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. 
government; and “in order to maintain the exchange rate effects that lay behind the 
acquisition of U.S. dollars, those dollars must be invested in dollar-denominated 
securities.”150  
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Above all, the massive accrual of foreign reserve holdings is likely the biggest 
driver in Chinese investment in U.S. securities. As the world’s largest economy and 
biggest capital market, the United States is the only global market large enough to 
accommodate China’s substantial foreign holdings. The financial crisis in Europe and 
economic issues in Japan have left China with few options to invest its sizeable foreign 
reserves.151 In his hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, Research Fellow for Asia Economic Policy at The Heritage Foundation, 
Derek Scissors testified that “Chinese investment is largely involuntary, a function of 
having a great deal of money and no place else to put it. Who needs the other more varies 
with American and international financial conditions.  
The more money the U.S. borrows, the more the American economy needs the 
PRC. The more desirable Treasury bonds are, the more China needs us.”152 The ultimate 
goal in any interdependent relationship between states is to create asymmetries in order to 
become the less dependent and increase power relative to another state. Less dependence 
can mean more power. Clearly articulating the dangers to the United States of a Chinese 
economic rebalancing, Stephen Roach writes: 
Therein lies what could be a critical source of global tension – an 
asymmetrical global rebalancing scenario. China, the world’s largest 
surplus saver, could well rebalance before the United States, the world’s 
largest deficit saver. Such an outcome could prove quite problematic for 
the U.S. economy and for world financial markets.153 
C. CHINA TIPPING THE SCALES 
In March 2007, Premier Wen Jiaboao publicly stated that China’s economy had 
become unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.154 China has recognized 
the need for major economic structural rebalancing. Economic reforms in China are not 
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only required to lessen dependence on the United States, but to fix substantial underlying 
structural problems that threaten to hamper its long-term growth. The question is now 
more about how China will go about such a significant economic transformation.  
Acknowledging the need for major economic restructuring to sustain economic 
growth, China’s last two FYPs (Eleventh FYP from 2006 to 2010 and Twelfth FYP from 
2011 to 2015) shifted economic emphasis from an export and investment-led economy to 
a consumer-led economy, placing heavy emphasis on indigenous innovation.155 Thus, far, 
China’s real GDP growth has been dependent on fixed investment and exports, but as 
China’s technological development reaches the levels of major developed nations, it must 
implement widespread economic reforms and become a major center for new technology 
and innovation to prevent economic stagnation.156 In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
re-emphasized the need for increased indigenous innovation to strengthen economic 
development by stating: “Implementing a strategy of innovation-driven development will 
be fundamental in accelerating the transformation of China’s growth pattern, solving 
deep-rooted problems concerning economic development, and enhancing economic 
vitality.”157  
Deeming science and technology crucial to economic development and 
international competitiveness, China adopted a policy of indigenous innovation (zizhu 
chuangxin) in 2006, defining indigenous innovation as “enhancing original innovation 
through co-innovation and re-innovation based on the assimilation of imported 
technologies.”158 Consequently, the 2006 National Medium to Long-Term Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology, 2006–2020 (MLP) was developed in an effort 
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to shift from its current growth model to a more sustainable model by making scientific 
modernization and indigenous innovation the drivers of future economic growth.159  
Micah Springut, Stephen Schlaikjer, and David Chen argue however, that 
indigenous innovation means something vastly different in China than it does in the 
United States. For China, indigenous innovation is not necessarily technological self-
sufficiency or the creation of new ideas, but rather extracting desired technology and 
adapting it for the needs of the nation.160 The MLP clearly identifies foreign technology 
as a key component to the development of Chinese IP and technological innovation.161 
“As a result, the plan is considered by many international technology companies to be a 
blueprint for technology theft on a scale the world has never seen before,” writes James 
McGregor.162 Despite China’s push for a significant reduction in foreign technology 
dependence, Chinese policies that inhibit research creativity, favor particular government 
industries, and neglect protection of IP rights prevent Chinese indigenous innovation 
from reaching its full potential and have led to technological gaps that can only be filled 
by foreign research and technology. 
As China’s dependence on foreign technology has grown, so have its conflicts 
with the United States over IP rights and technology transfer standards. Unfair trade 
practices, policies that support and protect particular government favored Chinese 
industries, widespread infringement of U.S. intellectual property rights, and trade and 
investment barriers that limit opportunities for U.S. in China have done little to quell U.S. 
concerns.163  
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William Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna Puglisi argue that “China’s quest 
for foreign technology goes well beyond the modest efforts to supplement indigenous 
research that most countries pursue as common practice. Rather, it is part of a deliberate, 
state-sponsored project to circumvent the costs of research, overcome cultural 
disadvantages, and ‘leapfrog’ to the forefront by leveraging the creativity of other 
nations.”164 Given the economic interdependence between the United States and China, 
and the fact that the United States is one of the biggest leaders in technology and 
innovation, it makes sense that China would seek to fill important capability gaps through 
espionage and theft of U.S. IP. Roach argues that although China and the United States 
have become increasingly more reliant on each other for economic growth, “there are no 
guarantees that both nations are equally afflicted,” resulting in the development of an 
“asymmetrical coping mechanism.”165  
The following chapter investigates how, because U.S. innovation and IP is a 
critical source of U.S. economic growth and global competitiveness, China has chosen 
cyber-enabled illicit acquisition of U.S. technology and intellectual property as its 
asymmetrical coping mechanism to shift the balance of power within U.S.-China 
economic interdependence.  
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III. CHINESE CYBER-ENABLED ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
Although concerns about cyberspace and cyber security have leapt to the forefront 
of U.S.-China relations, China’s cyber behavior cannot be dissociated from its political 
and economic relations. “China poses an especially difficult problem [to the United 
States], given the size and importance of its economy and the interdependence of the 
Chinese economy with those of the United States, Europe, and Japan,” argues the IP 
Commission.166 As the interdependence between U.S. and China expands U.S. markets, 
it also provides Chinese government agencies and Chinese businesses greater 
opportunities to collect sensitive U.S. economic information while leapfrogging the 
Research and Development (R&D) phase.167 Hannas, Mulvenon, and Puglisi emphasize 
how important timing has been for China, reasoning that China is “emerging as a global 
economic power at a time when nearly every secret worth stealing sits on a computer 
server.”168  
With the global rise of the Internet, the United States has witnessed massive 
intrusion and data exfiltration campaigns against U.S. public and private industries by the 
Chinese government and Chinese government-owned enterprises. According to McAfee, 
“Numerous sources of intellectual property exist inside today’s global companies…to say 
these intellectual property sources represent the heart and core value of companies 
worldwide is an understatement. When these intellectual property sources get 
compromised, capitalism and commerce are compromised on a global scale.”169  
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Economic espionage not only affects revenue and income, but undermines 
corporate innovation, having devastating effects on the national and global economy. “In 
a world where the highest-value assets are intangible and easy to transfer over networks, 
espionage has taken on a new dimension,” argues the IP Commission.170 China has 
swiftly adapted to this new environment by shifting its traditional intelligence collection 
operations to cyber collection operations. “Given the choice between traditional 
espionage and cyber espionage, it is only natural that intelligence services would 
increasingly pick the less risky, cheaper, and faster way of doing business,” state Hannas, 
Mulvenon, and Puglisi.171 China has taken economic espionage to a new level through 
cyberspace, stealing sensitive U.S. economic data at an unprecedented rate and with 
significant costs to the U.S. economy.  
A. COSTS TO THE U.S. ECONOMY  
Many analysts believe that trade secrets, proprietary information, copyrights, 
patents, and trademarks, all considered IP, represent the U.S. advantage in the global 
economy. Theft of IP by foreign economic competitors jeopardizes this advantage by 
inhibiting the business sector’s “ability to create jobs, generate revenues, foster 
innovation, and lay the economic foundation for prosperity and national security.”172 The 
IP Commission Report assesses the damage to the U.S. economy to be approximately 
$300 billion a year, with 50 percent to 80 percent of international IP theft originating in 
China (see additional information below).173  
Yet the cost of cyber-enabled economic espionage includes more than the stolen 
property itself. James Lewis argues that “there are opportunity costs, damage to brand 
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and reputation, consumer losses from fraud, the opportunity costs of service disruptions 
‘cleaning up’ after cyber incidents, and the cost of increased spending on cyber 
security.”174 Moreover, IP theft slows the development of new inventions and new 
industries by undermining the means and the incentive for entrepreneurs to innovate, 
causing stagnation of innovation and inhibiting expansion of the world economy.175  
To put the intellectual property loss into perspective, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce identified 75 of 313 U.S. industries as IP-intensive that directly accounted for 
27.1 million U.S. jobs and 18.8 percent of all employment in the 2010 economy. These 
IP-intensive industries also accounted for 34.8 percent of U.S. GDP while indirectly 
supporting 12.9 million additional supply-chain jobs throughout the economy. All in all, 
the most IP-intensive industries either directly or indirectly accounted for 27.7 percent of 
all jobs (40 million jobs) in the United States and 60.7 percent of total U.S. merchandise 
exports ($775 billion) in 2010.176  
China, however, has threatened U.S. technological competitiveness and economic 
prosperity for more than a decade through the use of cyberspace. In a hearing before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Lewis stated the United States has always been 
upfront with China that “espionage is a two-way street, something that all great powers 
do, and that espionage against military and political targets is legitimate” but that the 
United States “objects to economic espionage” and “rampant commercial cyber 
espionage.”177 The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates Chinese theft of U.S. 
intellectual property in the form of lost sales, royalties, and license fees to be $48.2 
billion in 2009 alone with another $4.8 billion spent by firms to address Chinese 
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infringement.178 Because “the entire U.S. economy relies on some form of IP,” with 
every industry using or producing it, the theft of IP by China directly affects U.S. strength 
in the global economy.179 
B. SEIZING THE ADVANTAGE 
With cyber espionage forming such a significant portion of Chinese economic 
growth, Chinese leadership likely will be unwilling to put this at risk. “There will be a 
domestic political price for Beijing to bring cyber espionage under control and little 
incentive for the party’s leadership to pay this price absent external pressure and a 
changed view of what best serves China’s own interests,” asserts Lewis.180 Lewis 
continues: “China uses cyber techniques to redress what it sees as an imbalance of power, 
using cyber espionage to compensate for its technological lag and weak national 
innovation capability.”181 While economic espionage is a problem in many developing 
nations, it is especially prevalent in China where its future as a regional hegemon rests on 
continued economic growth and prosperity.  
Despite U.S. condemnation, the number of cyber-espionage and cyber-theft 
intrusions attributed to private Chinese companies, Chinese state-owned enterprises, and 
the Chinese government continues to grow. The following cases of Chinese cyber-
enabled economic espionage clearly show the pervasiveness of China’s economic 
espionage and how cyberspace is being used to alter the balance of economic power 
between the United States and China. 
Night Dragon: Beginning in late 2009, China conducted coordinated covert cyber 
attacks against the global energy sector, specifically sensitive competitive proprietary 
operations and project-financing information on global oil, energy, and petrochemical 
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companies.182 Using servers in the United States and the Netherlands, files focusing on 
operational oil and gas field production systems and financial documents related to field 
exploration and bidding were copied and downloaded from oil, energy, and 
petrochemical companies as well as executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the 
United States for at least two years.183 Based on the operations originating from several 
locations within China and the use of cyber tools and techniques developed in China, 
McAfee publicly attributed these attacks, named Night Dragon, to China in 2011.184  
APT1: In one of the most important unclassified documents released on cyber 
attacks against the United States, the Mandiant Intelligence Report attributed 141 cyber 
intrusion victims to the 2
nd
 Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), also known 
by its cover name of Unit 61398, bridging the gap between one of the most persistent 
Chinese cyber actors and the Chinese government.185 Since 2006, APT1 has stolen 
hundreds of terabytes of data including technology blueprints, proprietary manufacturing 
processes, minutes from meetings involving high-ranking personnel, test results, business 
plans, pricing documents, partnership agreements, and emails of high-ranking employees 
from 20 major industries.186  
The Mandiant report claims the reason the economic espionage was so persistent, 
extensive, and successful was because it received direct support from the Chinese 
government. The report states: “APT1 has demonstrated the capability and intent to steal 
from dozens of organizations across a wide range of industries virtually 
simultaneously…The scope of APT1’s parallel activities implies that the group has 
significant personnel and technical resources at its disposal.”187 Although Mandiant has 
witnessed the exfiltration of massive volumes of valuable intellectual property from 
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APT1, they believe this is only a small portion of the cyber espionage that APT1 has 
executed since its inception.188  
Operation Shady Rat: In 2011, McAfee published the results of a five-year 
targeted cyber operation that hit at least 71 global organizations, including U.S. federal, 
county, and state governments; defense contractors; Fortune 100 companies, the United 
Nations, and the International Olympic Committee. Of the 71 victims, 49 were U.S. 
companies, government agencies, defense contractors, and non-profit organizations. The 
most heavily targeted victims were U.S. government entities (15 total) and U.S. defense 
contractors (12 total).  
While McAfee does not directly attribute the attacks to a specific actor, one only 
has to read the facts in the report to understand that a direct finger was being pointed at 
China.189 McAfee emphasizes the importance of these intrusions stating:    
What we have witnessed over the past five to six years has been nothing 
short of a historically unprecedented transfer of wealth—closely guarded 
national secrets (including those from classified government networks), 
source code, bug databases, email archives, negotiation plans and 
exploration details for new oil and gas field auctions, document stores, 
legal contracts, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
configurations, design schematics, and much more has “fallen off the 
truck” of numerous, mostly Western companies and disappeared in the 
ever-growing electronic archives of dogged adversaries.190 
Operation Aurora: Operation Aurora, also referred to as the Google hacking 
attack that occurred in January 2010, targeted at least 34 companies in the technology, 
financial, and defense sectors to gain access to and potentially modify source code 
repositories that Dmitri Alperovitch states are “the crown jewels of most of these 
companies” and “much more valuable than any financial or personally identifiable 
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data.”191 McAfee, which attributes the attacks to the Chinese government, called these 
attacks a “watershed event” for two reasons.  
First, a new precedent had been set by a company as large as Google with openly 
admitting to a security breach. Second, while cyber espionage is common between 
foreign governments, it was a “big game-changer” for corporations to witness attacks 
from a government into corporate entities.192 Alperovitch stated that “we have never 
ever, outside of the defense industry, seen commercial industrial companies come under 
that level of sophisticated attack.”193 Directly after the attacks were identified, Google 
publicly announced that the highly sophisticated attacks successfully targeted IP at 
Google and other high-value companies.194  
American Superconductor Corporation: Between 2008 and 2011, the American 
Superconductor Corporation (AMSC) lost 90 percent of its stock value after its wind-
energy software code was stolen by a major customer in China. While AMSC engineers 
were troubleshooting a turbine malfunction in China, they discovered the hardware had 
been running on a pirated version of AMSC’s software. In March 2011, China’s Sinovel 
Wind Group, AMSC’s largest customer, abruptly ended the contract, which accounted for 
more than $210 million in 2010 revenue, causing investors to flee. Within six months, 
AMSC lost 84 percent of its value.195 
In 2011, a software engineer for AMSC’s research facility confessed to being 
hired by Sinovel to create turbine software using stolen source code from AMSC’s 
server. According to Michael Riley and Ashlee Vance, the Chinese government was 
equally complicit. Sinovel was given advanced information on state-planned wind farms 
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by the Chinese government prior to government bidding for a mega-wing project in 2008 
and eventually awarded 47 percent of the project. Adding insult to injury, the day after 
the IP theft went public, AMSC computer networks were hit by a cyber attack in which 
company executives were emailed spyware designed to copy confidential data and 
internal communications.196 
Fortune 500 Manufacturing Company: In 2010, Mandiant reported that an APT 
compromised computers of senior executives within a U.S. Fortune 500 manufacturing 
company that was negotiating the acquisition of a Chinese corporation. During the 
negotiation period between the two companies, sensitive pricing data and details on U.S. 
negotiation strategies was exfiltrated on a weekly basis. Mandiant assessed that because 
the executives targeted were directly involved in the negotiations with the Chinese 
company, it was most likely an effort by the Chinese company to gain an advantage 
during negotiations. Although early notification of the compromise allowed the U.S. 
manufacturing corporation to cancel the acquisition, their business objectives were 
unable to be fulfilled.197 
DuPont and Cargill: In 2011, a Chinese scientist was convicted of Economic 
Espionage and Theft of Trade Secrets for providing scientists at Hunan Normal 
University, the National Natural Science Foundation of China, and China’s 863 Program 
(all three funded by the Chinese government) with sensitive data on agrochemical and 
biotechnology products from Dow AgroSciences and Cargill Inc. Kexue Huang, a 
research scientist and research leader in the development of biotechnology development 
for organic insecticides for Dow AgroSciences from 2003–2008 and as a biotechnologist 
for Cargill, Inc., from 2008–2009,  transferred stolen proprietary data with the intent of 
benefiting the government of China.  
Huang used the stolen materials to conduct unauthorized research with students 
from Hunan Normal University, earning grant money from the National Natural 
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Foundation of China to conduct further research and publish findings in scientific 
journals in China. Additionally, Huang identified manufacturing facilities in China that 
could produce products based on the stolen research and compete directly with Dow in 
the established organic pesticide market.198 Huang also admitted to downloading DNA 
sequences for a key component in the manufacture of a new food product while at Cargill 
and providing it to scientists at Hunan Normal University. The Department of Justice 
estimates the loss from misappropriated trade secrets somewhere between $7 million and 
$20 million.199   
Chinese Telecommunications: In October 2012, the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) issued an investigative report on two Chinese 
telecommunication companies, Huawei Technologies and ZTE Inc., concluding that 
“risks associated with Huawei’s and ZTE’s provision of equipment to U.S. critical 
infrastructure could undermine core U.S. national-security interests.”200 During a year-
long investigation requested by Huawei Technologies, the HPSCI discovered evidence of 
both economic espionage, through the extraction of sensitive information and IP from 
U.S. companies; and state-sponsored support from the Chinese government, with Huawei 
having direct ties to China’s Signals Intelligence Division.201  
During testimony before the HPSCI during the investigation, Huawei and ZTE 
attested that the backdoors (illegal remote access to a computer) found in their software 
were not intentional vulnerabilities, but rather flaws in the software itself.202 Though the 
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precedence set by the HPSCI report has significant national security implications, it also 
signifies U.S. government understanding of China’s attempts to shift the economic 
balance of power in their favor using advanced technology in cyberspace. The report 
affirms: “The capacity to maliciously modify or steal information from government and 
corporate entities provides China access to expensive and time-consuming research and 
development that advances China’s economic place in the world.”203 
While China continues to deny allegations of economic espionage and cyber 
intrusions into U.S. systems, the depth of resources necessary to sustain the current scope 
of computer network exploitation far exceeds the capabilities of hackers and cyber 
criminals and is nearly impossible without some type of state-sponsorship.
204
 The 
overwhelming evidence presented by Mandiant in its APT1 report is a testament to this 
premise.205 Furthermore, the existence of a government program, identified by the Office 
of the National Counterintelligence Executive as Project 863, aimed at directing and 
funding the procurement of sensitive economic data and U.S. technology through 
clandestine means, highlights the magnitude of the operations China is undertaking to 
shift the balance of power.    
C. ECONOMIC GROWTH PLANS OR CYBER ROAD MAPS? 
The proliferation of cyberspace and upsurge in computer technology combined 
with a number of major economic challenges has made cyber-enabled economic 
espionage vital to China’s economic development. Cyber-enabled economic espionage 
allows China to produce new sources of technology without having to invest the time and 
money to conduct R&D and without having to address distortive economic policies such 
as government support for state-owned firms and the lack of the rule of law in China.206 
While China continues to deny allegations of economic espionage and cyber intrusions 
into U.S. systems, China’s cyber-enabled economic espionage clearly corresponds to the 
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technological advancement and indigenous innovation initiatives identified in both its 
Twelfth FYP and National Medium to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science 
and Technology, 2006–2020 (MLP). This section discusses how, essentially, China is 
using advanced cyber tools to steal the data it needs to meet the technology and 
innovation goals outlined in both plans. 
China’s Twelfth FYP, designed like previous FYPs as an economic roadmap to 
communicate policy goals, differs from previous plans by placing a much larger 
emphasis on scientific development and indigenous innovation.207 One of the major 
features of the Twelfth FYP is the concept of seven strategic emerging industries (SEIs) 
that are instrumental in China’s push for a more advanced technology-driven economy 
and increasing the global competitiveness of Chinese businesses to support sustained 
economic growth. Three of the SEIs are designed to promote sustainable growth, while 
the remaining four are designed to move China up in global competitiveness. The seven 
SEIs within the Twelfth FYP are as follows:208 
Sustainable Growth: 
1. Clean Energy Technology: Including high-efficiency and energy saving 
equipment, pollution control, and advanced environmental protection. 
2. Alternative Energy: Including smart power grids; and nuclear, solar, wind, 
and biomass power. 
3. Clean Energy Vehicles: Including electric hybrid cars, pure electric cars, 
and fuel cell cars. 
Increase Global Competitiveness: 
4. Next-Generation Information Technology: Including cloud computing, 
integrated circuits, smart devices, high-end software and servers, next-
generation Internet equipment, and telecommunications. 
5. Biotechnology: Including biopharmaceuticals, biomedicine, 
biomanufacturing, marine biology, and innovative pharmaceuticals. 
6. New Materials: Including high-performance composites, new function 
materials, semiconductors, LED, special glass, and structural materials.  
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7. High-End Equipment Manufacturing: Including aerospace and space, rail 
and transportation, ocean engineering, and smart assembly. 
Intended as “the backbone of China’s next phase of industrial modernization and 
technological development,” the Twelfth FYP may also be viewed as a blueprint for 
economic espionage and theft of IP.209 Mandiant states that “organizations in all 
industries related to China’s strategic priorities are potential targets of APT1’s 
comprehensive cyber espionage campaign” pointing out that 115 of the 141 APT1 victims 
“match industries that China has identified as strategic to their growth, including four of 
the seven strategic emerging industries that China identified in its 12
th
 Five-Year Plan” 
(see Figure 8).210  
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Figure 8.  Timeline of APT1 Compromises by Industry Sector211 
The similarities among major policy plans and Chinese cyber-enabled economic 
espionage are not restricted to just China’s Twelfth FYP. China’s MLP, designed as a 15-
year science and technology plan, shares similar goals to the Twelfth FYP, while 
focusing more specifically on technological development and indigenous innovation. The 
MLP is China’s plan to turn the Chinese economy into a “technology powerhouse by 
2020 and a global leader by 2050” through indigenous innovation.212 According to 
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Springut, Schlaikjer, and Chen “the MLP calls for an unprecedented mobilization of 
resources for R&D projects in 11 ‘priority fields,’ eight areas of ‘frontier technology,’ 
and another eight areas of ‘cutting-edge science’ challenges.”213 The eight areas of 
“frontier technology” within the MLP are as follows: 
1. Advanced Energy 
2. Information Technology 
3. Biotechnology 
4. New Materials  
5. Advanced Manufacturing 
6. Aerospace and Aeronautics 
7. Lasers 
8. Ocean Technologies 
The areas share an uncanny resemblance to the Twelfth FYP’s SEIs as well as Chinese 
cyber intrusions and cyber-enabled economic espionage against the United States.  
Although the MLP calls for “establishing the nation’s credibility and image in 
international cooperation” and “to perfect the nation’s intellectual property rights 
system,” preferential government policies, forced technology transfer, lacking incentives 
for research creativity and innovation, and disregard for IP rights create an environment 
in which illicit technology transfer is necessary to meet national priorities.214 McGregor 
argues that “with these “indigenous innovation industrial policies, it is very clear that 
China has switched from defense to offense.”215 Using Mandiant and McAfee cyber 
intrusion reports and Department of Justice economic espionage and trade secret criminal 
cases (see Appendix for the Department of Justice cases presented), Figure 9 depicts the 
similarities among China’s Twelfth FYP and MLP and specific cases of Chinese cyber-
enabled economic espionage against the United States. The unmistakable overlaps 
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between the MLP, Twelfth FYP, and cases of Chinese cyber-enabled economic 
espionage are difficult to dispute. 
 
Figure 9.  Similarities Among China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, National 
Medium Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology (2006–
2020), and Specific Cases of Chinese Cyber Espionage Against the 
United States.216  
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D. CHINESE RESOLVE 
Recognizing the power potential in the cyber domain, China has aggressively 
used cyberspace to gain a competitive advantage in the economic and political domains. 
Lewis echoes this point when he writes: “China has integrated the use of cyber 
techniques into its military doctrine and economic policies far more comprehensively 
than any other nation in the region.”217 Through cyber-enabled economic espionage, 
China has not only identified a mechanism to overcome its lacking domestic innovation, 
but also a way to weaken the U.S. economy. If a major problem for China’s continued 
economic growth is the lack of innovation, and the United States is the largest innovator 
in the world, why expend the time and resources on domestic innovation when it can be 
retrieved through cyber espionage?  
As China continues to syphon U.S. trade secrets and IP at an alarming rate, it 
races to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy and possibly challenge 
U.S. hegemony. Despite international backlash, public exposure, and direct accusations 
from the U.S. government, China continues to maintain its persistent state-sponsored 
economic espionage. Rightly stated in Mandiant’s 2104 Threat Report, China’s 
unwillingness to discontinue its intrusive cyber operations suggests China “believes the 
benefits of its cyber espionage campaigns outweigh the potential costs of an international 
backlash.”218  
This chapter’s demonstration of China’s extensive use of the cyber domain to 
conduct economic espionage demonstrates China’s resolve to shift the balance of 
economic power, given by asymmetric interdependence, away from the United States. 
This chapter also underscores the importance of the next chapter’s investigation on 
China’s use of asymmetric interdependence as a coercive political tool and potential 
source of power against the United States.  
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IV. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: CAN CHINA RISE PEACEFULLY? 
With China’s rise as a potential great power—owing much to its significant 
economic growth that, in turn, has expanded its political and military power—the U.S.-
China relationship has become one of the most important bilateral relationships in the 
world. The ascent of China is changing the international order, making global stability 
increasingly more dependent on U.S.-China relations.
219
 This relationship is not without 
its problems, however. “Hanging over the relationship is the larger question of whether, 
as China grows in economic and military power, the United States and China can manage 
their relationship in such a way as to avoid debilitating rivalry and conflict that have 
accompanied the rise of new powers in previous eras,” states Susan Lawrence.220 If the 
past provides any indication of the future, history does not offer a favorable outcome for 
U.S.-China relations. Looking solely at the rise and fall of great powers over the last 500 
years, in “11 of 15 cases since 1500 in which a rising power rivaled a ruling power, the 
outcome was war.”221 
As the United States struggles with how to address China’s massive cyber-
enabled economic espionage campaign, threatening U.S. economic growth and stability, 
it does so in an environment in which China is emerging as a potential great power. 
“China’s rise has occurred within a world system still dominated by American unilateral 
authority. Because of these imbalances, China has naturally sought to find asymmetrical 
advantages, and cyberspace at first glance appears to be a dimension of national power in 
which the United States is asymmetrically vulnerable,” state Hannas, Mulvenon, and 
Puglisi.
222
 What is clear so far is that both the United States and China are entangled in an 
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economically interdependent relationship that neither is comfortable maintaining in its 
current state.  
With the United States leading the world in global innovation and China’s long-
term economic growth relying on innovation and technological advancement, China 
continues to seek cyber-enabled economic espionage as a mechanism to create an 
asymmetry in the interdependent economic relationship. China’s use of cyberspace 
allows China to increase the global competitiveness of Chinese businesses and overcome 
its lacking domestic innovation in order to support sustained economic growth, all the 
while weakening the U.S. economy. While China has demonstrated its willingness to use 
cyber-enabled economic espionage to shift the balance of economic power it its favor, the 
larger question is whether China is willing to then use the asymmetric interdependence as 
a source of power to affect other areas of the U.S.-China relationship. This chapter 
explains why previous patterns of Chinese behavior indicate that the answer is yes. 
A. CHINA’S USE OF ASYMMETRIC ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
AS A SOURCE OF POWER 
In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with a Japanese Coast Guard 
vessel near the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea resulting in a major 
diplomatic dispute between China and Japan. When China’s numerous demands for the 
captain’s release were refused, China halted shipments of rare earth elements (REEs) to 
Japan—vital elements in high-tech products and cutting-edge modern technology.223  
Consisting of 17 related chemical elements essential to the production of hybrid 
cars, wind turbines, guided missiles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, computer hard-drives, 
and cellphones, REEs are actually not that rare. REEs can be found throughout the world; 
however their geochemical properties limit concentration as minerals making exploitation 
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extremely difficult and potentially devastating to the environment.
224 
China however, is 
willing to overlook the environmental effects in order to meet the needs of a growing 
market and maintain a dominant foothold in a lucrative REE business. According to Ed 
Dolan, with China’s embargo against Japan, “suddenly the world became aware that 
China, home to some 95 percent of global REE production, held an alarming strategic 
monopoly.”225  
Although China’s market share does not represent a true natural monopoly 
according to Dolan, the ownership of these unique resources does create an asymmetry 
within the China-Japan economic interdependent relationship. With Japan being the 
principal consumer of Chinese REEs, China was willing and able to leverage this 
vulnerability as a coercive tool that succeeded in gaining the release of the Chinese 
fishing boat and its captain. Keith Bradsher echoes this sentiment when he states that 
“until recently, China typically sought quick and quiet accommodations on trade issues. 
But the interruption in rare earth supplies is the latest sign from Beijing that Chinese 
leaders are willing to use their growing economic muscle.”226 
Key to what China deemed as successful diplomatic negotiations was the ability 
of China to manipulate the system. “Despite a widely confirmed suspension of rare earth 
shipments from China to Japan, Beijing has continued to deny the existence of an 
embargo,” Bradsher states.227 China’s denial of the export suspension and lack of official 
policy trail prevented Japan from immediately lodging a WTO complaint for violating 
free trade rules and allowed China to “wield an undeclared trade weapon.”228 Bradsher 
argues that “China has refrained until now from using its near monopoly on rare earth 
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elements as a form of leverage on other governments.”229 Yet China’s use of asymmetric 
economic interdependence as a source of diplomatic power was not only directed at 
Japan, but extended to the United States as well.  
With China the sole sources of REEs and Japan the main manufacturing capacity 
of REEs at the time, disruption of REE exports to Japan would make the United States 
completely reliant on China for crucial components used in defense assets such as jet 
fighter engines, missile guidance systems, antimissile defense, space-based satellites, and 
communication systems.
230
 “Rare earth elements are essential for a diverse and 
expanding array of high-technology applications, which constitute an important part of 
the industrial economy of the United States,” emphasizes the U.S. Geological Survey.231  
Although China’s original intent was to leverage its asymmetric economic 
interdependence to politically coerce Japan, China simultaneously created an asymmetry 
in the U.S.-China economic interdependent relationship with the same embargo. This 
asymmetry would almost instantly be leveraged by China when approximately a month 
after the exports to Japan stopped flowing, so too did the flow of REEs to the United 
States. Just days after U.S. trade officials announced an impending investigation against 
China for imposing export restraints on raw materials and breaking WTO rules by 
distorting trade and competition in the green technology sector, Chinese customs officials 
imposed broader REE export restrictions, halting nearly all shipments of REEs to the 
United States.
232  
But as Keohane and Nye argue, “strategies of manipulating interdependence are 
likely to lead to counterstrategies,” and the United States was unwilling to let China use 
its dependence on REEs as a coercive political tool.
233
 Instead, the United States met 
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China’s challenge by filing a two formal cases with the WTO citing China’s steady 
reduction of REE quotas since 2005 and exorbitant export taxes on rare earths were 
“illegal attempts to force multinational companies to produce more of their high-
technology goods in China,” giving domestic companies in China a competitive 
advantage in particular markets.
234
 Unlike Japan, the United States has the luxury of 
directly challenging China. With China home to only around 37 percent of world reserves 
and the United States sitting on significant REE reserves, a once self-reliant United States 
could once again look to extract REEs at home.
235
 In fact, as a result of China’s embargos 
and unfair trade practices in rare earths, U.S. policy makers continuously seek legislation 
to fiscally support reinvigoration of the U.S. REE industry in addition to negotiating 
additional capacity from Australia, Canada, Malaysia, and India.
236 
 
Nonetheless, Keohane and Nye point out that “sensitivity interdependence can 
provide the basis for significant political influence only when the rules and norms in 
effect can be taken for granted, or when it would be prohibitively costly for dissatisfied 
states to change their policies quickly.”237 With production lines in the United States and 
Japan set up to produce specific high-tech products, REE-dependent technologies cannot 
simply be shifted to alternative methods of production.
238 “You can’t just substitute nickel 
for the neodymium in a magnet and expect the product still to do its job,” states Dolan.239 
Although both Japan and the United States are sensitive to a Chinese REE embargo, with 
Japan more so than the United States, “the underlying capabilities of the United States 
reduces its vulnerability and makes its sensitivity less serious politically.”240  
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Keohane and Nye continue that “the vulnerability dimension of interdependence 
rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives various actors face.”241 
Japan’s vulnerability stems from a lack of available organic resources and costliness of 
finding substitutions, making it a prime target for Chinese manipulation. Despite 
numerous joint venture agreements and potential partnerships to obtain REEs, thus far, 
Japan has been unable to secure enough sources of particular REEs to break its 
vulnerability dependence with China. 
While economic interdependence can be used as a source of power, actors face 
potential consequences in doing so. In the case of China, although it holds a dominant 
position in the global supply chain, the temporary embargo immediately raised the global 
prices of rare earths and damaged China’s long-term trade interests.242 Chinese efforts to 
exploit its market advantage pushed dependent countries to develop alternative REE 
sources and new technologies states Dolan. Dolan argues that “after the East China Sea 
incident, concerns over reliability of supply, as much as concerns over price, are 
triggering research and investment to an extent that suggests that the long run—as in 
“long-run elasticity”—is fast approaching.”243 The United States, Japan, Canada, 
Australia, and India started looking both internally and externally for alternate sources of 
REEs. With more than 400 exploration projects popping up outside of China between 
2011 and 2013, prices of most REEs dropped approximately 60 percent.
244
  
Additionally, both WTO cases filed by the United States against China resulted in 
rulings against China for violation of trade obligations and WTO commitments. In the 
second WTO case filed against China for rare earth export restrictions, the United States 
was joined by the European Union, Japan, and Canada as complainants on the case, 
“indicating a degree of cooperation among some of the world’s largest economies, which 
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also constitute China’s largest trading partners.”245 China’s embargo against Japan 
demonstrated China’s willingness to use economic interdependence as a source of power 
to bend the political will of other states in its favor. This episode did little to build trust or 
credibility with major players within the international community, therefore also 
demonstrating the potential long-term costs of wielding such power for short-term gain in 
another issue area.  
China’s future willingness to use economic interdependence as a source of power 
in the broader U.S.-China relationship therefore is likely conditioned by Beijing’s 
perception of whether such long-term costs are manageable or avoidable. Based on 
China’s continued cyber espionage against the United States, it would appear that China 
believes the long-term costs of such behavior are manageable. In fact, according to 
Lowther et al., “a refusal by the Chinese government to control state sponsored cyber 
espionage will serve as a clear indication of how China’s leadership views the United 
States—with a lack of cooperation indicating it views the United States as a weakening 
power.”246 But just as China seeks the use of power derived from asymmetric 
interdependence, so too does the United States.  
B. U.S. STRONGHOLD ON INFORMATION POWER  
For decades, the United States has maintained a deliberate policy of using 
information as a source of power and a strategic instrument used to shape political, 
economic, and military behavior. U.S. doctrine identifies information as one of the four 
instruments of national power, U.S. presidential administrations publish a National 
Strategy for Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy, and military service 
branches possess information warfare units—highlighting the importance of information 
power to U.S. strategy. The Chinese embargo of REEs provides more than just an example 
of Chinese use of asymmetric economic interdependence as an instrument of political 
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coercion. It also provides an example of how the United States leverages its asymmetric 
advantage in the information domain to create a source of power against China.  
In the REE embargo example, the WTO dispute settlement cases filed by the 
United States served these two purposes in terms of information power. The first was to 
discredit China as a reliable economic and trade partner, emphasizing its disregard for 
following basic rules of free trade to which China agreed when it joined the WTO in 
2001. As Keohane and Nye point out, “credibility is the crucial resource [in information 
power], and asymmetrical credibility is a key source of power.”247 By formally filing a 
WTO case, the United States brought China’s credibility into question, publicizing that 
China violated global trade rules by imposing export restrictions on rare earths to create 
an unfair competitive advantage at the “expense of the economic interests of other 
countries.”248  
Keohane and Nye argue that “much of the traditional conduct of foreign policy 
occurs through the exchange of promises, which can be valuable only insofar as they are 
credible. Hence, governments that can credibly assure potential partners that they will not 
act opportunistically will gain advantages over competitors whose promises are less 
credible.”249 China’s implementation of trade embargoes, distortive economic and trade 
policies, and aggressive territorial disputes provides the United States with a distinct 
advantage over China in terms of credibility—one the United States is more than willing 
to exploit.  
The second purpose for filing a settlement case against China is to leverage the 
information power inherent in the collective action of international institutions. The 
United States, having helped create influential international organizations such as the 
United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (later becoming the WTO), understands the power in bringing “a measure of law 
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and reciprocity to international politics.”250 As the world’s largest economy and sole 
superpower, the United States possesses great shaping power in the establishment of 
multilateral partnerships and development of international norms—especially when its 
interests are at stake. The U.S. use of the WTO for dispute resolution in the REE case 
established legitimacy in U.S. grievances against China’s trade restrictions. It was no 
longer simply a bilateral disagreement between the United States and China, but rather a 
legitimate complaint lodged to a recognized international arbiter such as the WTO.  
The settlement case and subsequent WTO ruling in favor of the United States not 
only forces China to take corrective action (action that would likely not be taken 
otherwise), but validates the U.S. position and highlights China’s missteps to the 
international community. To China, its accession into the WTO in 2001 substantiated its 
position as a global economic power, but to the United States, it means the ability to 
formally hold China accountable through the collective action of member states without 
having to threaten economic sanctions or a potential military show of force. The use of 
international organizations by the United States is not limited to the REE issue. Through 
the WTO alone, the United States has submitted 15 of the 31 cases brought against China 
since its acceptance into the organization in 2001, indicating the willingness of the United 




The use of information power by the United States against China is not limited to 
traditional economic issues. With cyberspace enabling foreign economic espionage 
activities against U.S. enterprises and government agencies, risking long-term economic 
growth, the United States has a vested interest in leveraging information power to shape 
its interests in the cyber domain. “If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of 
others and establish international institutions that encourage others to define their 
interests in compatible ways, it may not need to expend as many costly traditional 
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economic or military resources,” state Keohane and Nye.252 As China continues its cyber-
enabled economic espionage campaign against the United States, the United States works 
diligently with other nations to develop an international consensus on acceptable 
behavior in cyberspace that reflects U.S. interests and normative principles. “The U.S. 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) states that U.S. involvement in developing 
international agreements and standards on cyberspace security and governance is 
essential to promoting U.S. national and economic security to the rest of the world.”253  
With the United States and China holding very different views on the rights and 
obligations of states in cyberspace, cyber security initiatives with a heavy U.S. influence 
could give the United States a significant source of power. Of the 19 organizations 
identified by the GAO as “key entities and efforts whose international activities 
significantly influence the security and governance of cyberspace,” the United States is 
either the lead or a key member.
254
 A U.S. led cyber security initiative leveraging 
international institutions benefits the United States in three ways: first, it shows a U.S. 
willingness to adhere to internationally established rules, adding legitimacy to its position 
as a global leader; second, it allows the United States to encourage China’s participation 
in international forums on cyber security as a show of U.S. good faith and acceptance of 
China as a rising power; and third, it makes China accountable for adhering to normative 
behavior in cyberspace heavily influenced by the United States. “As this effort [to create 
norms and agreement on state behavior in cyberspace] progresses and there is 
international consensus on responsible behavior in cyberspace, China’s cyber espionage 
will be difficult to sustain,” states Lewis.255  
Lewis argues that China’s maritime and cyber actions have created an “implicit 
commonality of interests among other regional powers” that “creates a powerful 
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incentive for cooperation and collective action.”256 Even without ratified international 
norms, the United States and other nations affected by China’s illicit cyber behavior 
could move beyond information power and seek to use existing international 
mechanisms, such as the WTO, to address China’s government-sponsored cyber 
espionage. The United States has made clear in its Administration Strategy on Mitigating 
the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets that it will use “trade policy tools to increase international 
enforcement against trade secret theft to minimize unfair competition against U.S. 
companies.”257 
The United States, long having used information as a strategic instrument of 
power, has also executed a persistent information campaign against China and its cyber 
behavior. After numerous failed attempts to address the cyber espionage issues directly 
with China, the United States took the issue public to call attention to China’s cyber 
espionage behavior: 
 In 2010 after Google announced China as being responsible for computer 
hacks into its corporate infrastructure, Secretary of State Clinton 
specifically asked the Chinese government for an explanation.
258 
 
 In 2011, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive released 
a report to Congress specifically naming “China as the ‘most active and 
persistent’ perpetrator of cyber intrusions into the United States.”259  
 In 2011, McAfee indirectly accused China of a five-year targeted cyber 
operation that hit at least 71 global organizations.
260
 
 In 2012, the HPSCI “issued a blistering bipartisan report” accusing two of 
China’s largest telecommunications companies, Huawei and ZTE, of 
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 In 2013, a number of U.S. senior officials publicly demanded that China 
cease its cyber-enabled economic espionage.
262 
 
 In February 2013, with U.S. government knowledge, Mandiant released its 
report on APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, linking 




One goal in publicizing China’s cyber behavior is to tarnish China’s credibility as 
a responsible world power. “Governments compete with each other and with other 
organizations to enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponent,” states 
Nye.
264
 By continuously publicizing technical details on China’s illicit cyber endeavors, 
the United States seeks to systematically weaken China’s position as a responsible 
stakeholder within the international community. China has done little to change public 
perceptions. China’s repeated denial of cyber espionage in the face of credible evidence 
has caused significant damage to its reputation. Additionally, China’s emphasis on cyber 
security cooperation and coordination while simultaneously maintaining its cyber 
espionage undermines its efforts to build trust with its international partners and plays 
right into the hands of the United States. With asymmetrical credibility a key source of 
power, the United States increases its power by drawing attention to China’s hypocrisy 
on cyber security issues.  
The information campaign against China, however, has not occurred without 
engagement and strategic dialogue between the two nations. In June 2013, during a one-
on-one meeting between President Obama and President Xi, cyber security was made the 
main focus of economic discussions in which President Obama “made clear the threat 
posed to U.S. economic and national security by cyber-enabled economic espionage.”265 
In July 2013, the first meeting of the U.S.-China Working Group on Cybersecurity 
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successfully took place in which both nations engaged in straightforward dialogue in an 
effort to improve cooperation in cyberspace.
266
 Additionally, “representing a new 
milestone in Sino-U.S. military-to-military information-sharing,” the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense traveled to Beijing in April 2014 to provide details on U.S. cyber forces, cyber 




Not only did the Chinese fail to reciprocate after the U.S. government laid their 
cards on the table, but after years of continued pressure by the United States to stop cyber 
economic espionage, China has proved unwilling. China’s unwillingness to address 
cyber-enabled economic espionage and its persistent economic espionage campaign 
against U.S. companies has pushed the U.S. government to take a different approach. In a 
bold move rarely taken against other foreign government employees, the Department of 
Justice charged five China’s People’s Liberation Army members on May 19, 2014, with 
economic espionage and requested extradition of the individuals to stand trial.
268
 
Knowing that the PLA members will not show up for trial, the indictment served more of 
a “signaling tool” to China that the United States “will not remain silent on state-
sponsored acts that harm U.S. national interests, including the competitiveness of U.S. 
firms.”269 China immediately suspended its participation in the bilateral Cybersecurity 
Working Group “given the U.S. lack of sincerity in resolving Internet security issues 
through dialogue and cooperation,” putting a halt to cooperation between the two nations 
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C. CHINA’S WILLINGNESS TO USE CYBERSPACE 
Despite the U.S. advantage in information power, China is keenly aware of the 
importance of the power in the information domain. Like the United States, China too has 
used strategic communications to discredit the United States and its cyber security 
agenda. After release of the U.S. indictment against PLA members, China’s state news 
agency called the actions a “deliberate fabrication” that “grossly violates the basic norms 
governing international relations and jeopardizes China-U.S. cooperation and mutual 
trust.”271 Xinhua news alleged that information revealed during the recent intelligence 
leaks demonstrates U.S. “hypocrisy” on cyber security issues and a “typical case of a 
thief crying thief” with the United States is at the center of the largest global hacking 
network.
272
 China also highlights what it believes is an unfair advantage in the U.S. use 
of its development of the Internet and major cyber technologies to influence cyber 
security initiatives.
273
 Additionally, China argues that its own cyber capabilities are a 
“defensive response to what it views as ‘hegemonic’ efforts by the United States to 
militarize cyberspace with offensive capabilities.”274  
China’s use of information power, however, goes well beyond influence and 
propaganda. China’s strength in the information domain is in its willingness to use 
cyberspace as a mechanism to create asymmetries in its interdependent relationships—
asymmetries that could potentially be used as a source of power in other issue areas. 
Hannas, Mulvenon, and Puglisi assert that “China seems much more comfortable with 
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cyber power as a legitimate, overt tool of state power, especially compared with the 
United States, which still treats cyber operations as a highly classified, compartmented 
capability.”275  
Although China’s cyber-enabled economic espionage provides China with a long-
term economic advantage in the U.S.-China economic interdependent relationship, it 
could also provide China with a significant source of power. The ability to go from 
stealing information to manipulating information to possibly destroying information in 
cyberspace can be a very powerful tool against a nation whose infrastructure and 
economic survivability has become dependent on cyberspace. China has proven its 
willingness to steal and manipulate information through cyber operations to shift the 
balance of power in particular issue areas, but its willingness to sacrifice key 
relationships with major powers such as the United States by conducting cyber attacks 
aimed at political coercion is a topic of debate. According to Jayson Spade, China is 
“conducting cyberspace reconnaissance; creating the ability to do economic harm and 
damage critical infrastructure; preparing to disrupt communications and information 
systems necessary to support conventional armed conflict; and readying to conduct 
psychological operations to influence the will of the American people.
276
  
If China’s REE embargo against Japan and subsequently the United States is any 
indication of its willingness to use asymmetric interdependence as a source of power, the 
likelihood of using cyber power as a coercive tool against the United States is more than 
feasible. In fact, during periods of heightened tension between the United States and 
China, Chinese hackers initiated cyber-attack campaigns against U.S. government 
entities. In 1999 after a U.S. aircraft accidently bombed the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade, Chinese hackers attacked government websites causing the Department of 
Energy website to go down for an entire day.
277
 Again, in 2001, Chinese hackers 
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launched a number of cyber-attacks against U.S. Government websites following the 
collision of a U.S. Navy EP-3 Aries reconnaissance aircraft and a People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) F-8 Finback fighter aircraft.
278
 In addition to the cyber-attacks 
against the United States, Chinese hackers were deemed responsible for attacks against 
the Japanese government in 2004 after a Senkaku Island dispute, the French Embassy 
website in 2008 in protest over a meeting with the Dalai Lama, and South Korean banks 
in 2013 amid tensions with North Koreas over nuclear weapons and missile testing.
279
 
The attacks against South Korea were attributed to North Korea but reportedly supported 
by China when the attacks were traced back to IP address in China.
280 
 
While there is no direct evidence of Chinese government sponsorship of these 
attacks, China has long been known to use hackers to carry out cyber espionage and 
“engage in politically coercive acts.”281 Lowther, Geis, Yannakogeorgos, and Dacus 
argue however, that “whether such activities are state-sponsored or not, China is proving 
unwilling to undertake efforts to stop them.”282 China’s cyber behavior indicates a level 
of comfort in the use of cyberspace as a coercive tool which, if left unchecked, 
strengthens China’s position within the U.S.-China relationship. For instance, in response 
to the U.S. indictment of the five PLA members, China’s state-owned news agency 
wrote: “China needs to respond. Suspending the operations of a bilateral group on cyber 
affairs is a reasonable start, but more countermeasures should be prepared in case 
Washington obstinately sticks to the wrong track.”283 The statement is a clear warning 
that China may look beyond diplomatic processes to address what it sees as an injustice.  
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The use of offensive cyber operations against the United States as a means of 
political coercion cannot be ruled out. In fact, as the United States continues to become 
more dependent on cyberspace for its economic growth and national security, it becomes 
more vulnerable to illicit Chinese cyber behavior. The National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace claims that “the threat of organized cyber attacks capable of causing 
debilitating disruption to our Nation’s critical infrastructures, economy, or national 
security” is a major concern.284  
Lowther et al., argue that China could use cyber attacks against U.S. commercial 
lines of communication (LOC), having potentially devastating effects on both the 
economy and national security. They state that “while closing sea and air LOCs to 
commercial traffic would clearly be seen as antagonistic and cause a loss of global 
goodwill, cyber attacks aimed at commercial interests (LOCs) can serve much the same 
purpose without arousing the same ire from the international community.”285 The 
difficulty of attribution in cyberspace provides China the ability to plausibly deny 
responsibility.  
Although China might consider certain actions to be below the threshold of what 
could be considered the use of force or an act of war, especially when denying 
responsibility, the United States has made clear in its Department of Defense Strategy for 
Operating in Cyberspace “that harmful action within the cyber domain can be met with a 
parallel response in another domain.”286 Should China be willing to use cyber power as a 
coercive tool against the United States, it risks the potential for conflict.  
D. POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT 
“Because of the newness of technology, the lack of agreement on norms, and the 
potential to misidentify an espionage exploit as the opening phase of a military action, 
cyber conflict entails a greater risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation of 
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conflict,” states Lewis.287 While it would be naïve to assume that nations would not 
preserve some cyber capability for intelligence collection and to support military actions, 
lack of agreement on the acceptable use of cyber capabilities plagues U.S.-China 
relations.  
The United States considers China’s cyber-enabled economic espionage 
intolerable behavior not only because of the damage it does to the U.S. economy, but also 
because of the ease at which a cyber exploit can become a cyber attack. The strategic 
goal for China however, is to avoid conflict, viewing armed conflict as an indication of 
failure.
288
 According to Joshua Cooper Ramo, “asymmetry represents the most efficient 
way to deal with the incredibly complex security environment China inhabits. China is in 
the process of building the largest asymmetric superpower in history.”289 Ramo argues 
that “true success” to China is the ability to manipulate a situation so effectively that the 
outcome favors Chinese interests in a way that enables China to acquire the power to 
avoid conflict.
290
 Thomas validates this notion when he asserts that China’s persistent 
cyber reconnaissance efforts against global powers indicate that China is trying to seek 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to achieve an economic or military victory.
291
  
Despite China’s desire to avoid conflict and its assurance that it seeks a peaceful 
rise to great power status, its recurrent acts of aggression undermine its efforts to build 
confidence among its regional neighbors and strategic partners.
292
 Lewis points out that 
“China’s cyber activities cannot be divorced from the larger security and political context 
in Asia, where Chinese actions have alienated many of its neighbors and have increased 
tensions by attempting to assert its regional authority.”293 As a result, no matter what 
China does to signal good intentions, China’s aggressive behavior coupled with its 
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strategic culture of “ambiguity, disinformation, and secrecy,” make other nations 
skeptical of a peaceful Chinese rise.
294 
 
The United States holds a similar view to China’s in that it too wants to prevent 
the escalation of hostilities by developing cooperative mechanisms on cyber security. If 
China ignores U.S. overtures to deal with illicit cyber behavior such as cyber-enabled 
economic espionage, the United States has conveyed its willingness to respond with 
military force. In a speech on Defense Department’s Cyber Strategy, former Deputy 
Secretary of Defense William Lynn, III, stated that “just as our military organizes to 
defend against hostile acts from land, air, and sea, we must also be prepared to respond to 
hostile acts in cyberspace. Accordingly, the United States reserves the right, under the 
laws of armed conflict, to respond to serious cyber attacks with a proportional and 
justified military response at the time and place of our choosing.”295 Though China may 
have prescribed a peaceful rise to great power status, its manipulation of asymmetrical 
interdependence as a means of achieving its rise, could very well push the United States 
to the brink of conflict. Keohane and Nye submit the following: 
It must always be kept in mind, furthermore, that military power 
dominates economic power in the sense that economic means alone are 
likely to be ineffective against the serious use of military force. Thus, even 
effective manipulation of asymmetrical interdependence within a 
nonmilitary area can create risks of military counteraction. When the 
United States exploited Japanese vulnerability to economic embargo in 




Although war between the United States and China is not inevitable, the persistent 
and mutual mistrust between the United States and China, exacerbated by China’s illicit 
cyber behavior, continues to afflict U.S.-China relations and could determine whether 
China’s rise will be a peaceful one. Thus, far, the United States and China have made the 
overall stability of the bilateral relationship a priority, with accommodation and 
                                                 
294 Sun Tzu, Art of War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 185–95. 
295 William J. Lynn, III, “Remarks on the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy,” As Delivered by 
Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, III, National Defense University, July 14, 2011, 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1593.  
296 Keohane and Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 16. 
 78 
cooperation central to its success. Lewis argues that “the rise of China means that other 
Asian nations must decide where to accommodate and where to confront a newly 
powerful China with aspirations to restore its regional position and power. In turn, 
China’s leaders must decide where an acceptance of international norms and systems best 
serves China’s interest and where challenging the existing order provides greater 
benefit.”297 Should China continue its persistent cyber-enabled economic espionage 
campaign or threaten to use the cyber domain as a source of coercive power, it would 
likely indicate China’s willingness to sacrifice relations with the United States to meet its 
own core interests and that the costs of that sacrifice no longer exceed the tangible 
benefits.   
E. CONCLUSION 
While it would be difficult to say with any certainly what the future holds for 
U.S.-China relations or if China’s ascent to great power status will be a peaceful one, 
China’s cyber behavior does provides some indication about the role of economic 
interdependence in U.S.-China relations. Over the last three decades, the United States 
and China have become heavily reliant on each other as a major source of economic 
growth. The United States has turned to China for its inexpensive goods and abundance 
of foreign capital to support its consumption model.
298 
Similarly, China has turned to the 
United States as the world’s single largest import market to support an export- and 
investment-led growth model.299 “Two large economies had large gaps to fill and they 
quickly became hooked on what each could offer the other in their collective quest for 
economic growth,” states Roach.300  
Now intertwined in a somewhat balanced economic interdependent relationship, 
both the United States and China seek to manipulate the relationship in an effort to 
become the less dependent actor. Despite increasing concerns from both nations, neither 
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has been able to rebalance their economies enough to create an asymmetrical advantage 
over the other. Instead, through cyberspace operations, China has systematically 
conducted an economic espionage campaign against U.S. companies and government 
entities to acquire technology and IP and shift the economic balance of power in its favor.  
China’s theft of IP, costing the United States billions of dollars annually, clearly 
provides China an advantage.
301
 With China’s push for increased indigenous innovation 
to strengthen economic development, cyber-enabled economic espionage allows China to 
bypass the costs of R&D and jump to the forefront of technological innovation by 
stealing other nations’ hard work. As a result, China’s cyber espionage threatens U.S. 
technological competitiveness and economic prosperity. Although China denies 
accusations of cyber-enabled economic espionage, the capacity to conduct computer 
network exploitation operations to the extent that has been attributed to China is nearly 
impossible without some type of state-sponsorship.302 Furthermore, China’s Twelfth FYP 
and National Medium to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology, 2006–2020 (MLP), both focusing on indigenous innovation and 
technological advancement, read like a cyber espionage blueprint when compared 
directly to Chinese cyber intrusions and cyber-enabled economic espionage against the 
United States.303 While the United States uses its power in the information domain to call 
attention to China’s brazen cyber espionage behavior and gain collective support against 
China’s cyber-enabled economic espionage, there are no indications the public exposure 




Beyond China’s use of cyber-enabled economic espionage to shift the balance of 
power in the U.S-China economic interdependent relationship, China also recognizes the 
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power potential in the cyber domain. China has aggressively used cyberspace to gain a 
competitive advantage in the economic domain. But is China willing to then leverage the 
asymmetric economic interdependence as a source of power? Furthermore, is China 
willing to use its cyber capabilities as a means of political coercion? Based on the 
research conducted for this thesis, the answer is yes.  
China has used asymmetric economic interdependence as a source of power and 
instrument of political coercion and China would likely be willing to do so against the 
United States should the economic balance of power shift in its favor. However, even if 
the United States becomes the more dependent party in the economic relationship, 
China’s ability to use the asymmetry as a source of power will depend on United States 
sensitivity and vulnerability dependence to particular Chinese actions. For instance, if 
after understanding the implication to its own economy China decided to use U.S. 
Treasury securities as a coercive tool against the United States by dumping mass 
quantities on the market in an effort to destabilize the U.S. economy, the United States 
would be sensitive to the immediate effects of U.S. Treasury security devaluation and 
increased inflation. Yet, with the Federal Reserve prepared to purchase U.S. Treasuries 
dumped on the market in such a situation, the economic impact to the United States is 
significantly reduced as is its vulnerability to this particular Chinese action.305  
Alternatively, if China decided to conduct cyber attacks against U.S. banks in 
response to U.S. trade sanctions or arms deals with Taiwan, devoid of any changes to 
U.S. policy, the United States would be substantially more vulnerable since U.S. 
government protection is in cyberspace is not extended to most of the private sector.
306
 
With the United States having articulated its intent to respond to serious cyber attacks 
with a proportional and justified response in another domain, China’s potential use of 
cyberspace to conduct offensive operations makes escalation of hostilities and the 
potential for conflict a real possibility.
307 
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China’s approach to cyber espionage reflects its willingness to risk its economic 
relationships to achieve its own economic and political policy goals. China, “motivated 
by the desire to achieve economic, strategic, and military parity with the United States” 
will likely continue to use cyber espionage as a means to acquire U.S. technology and 
sensitive economic information.308 China has little need to accept international norms, 
especially in cyberspace, if it is willing to bully its way to the top. However, to peacefully 
maintain its continued ascent to great power status, China will have to demonstrate a 
willingness to accept normative behavior set by international institutions and multilateral 
agreements or face potential collective action by embittered major powers. “Cyber 
security is a fundamental test of China’s willingness to play by the rules and whether its 
integration into the international system will be peaceful,” states Lewis.309 Should China 
continue its cyber-enabled economic espionage campaign against the United States, it 
could indicate that China judges that the potential costs of its cyber espionage programs 
outweigh the benefits of its relationship with the United States.  
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APPENDIX. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CASES OF CHINESE 
CYBER ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 
The following cases are a select number of Department of Justice Economic 
Espionage and Trade Secret Criminal Cases that were identified in Chapter III, Figure 9, 
page 57, of this thesis. The information included in each case was taken verbatim from 
source material.310 
Military Technical Data and Trade Secrets to China – On Sept. 26, 2012, Sixing 
Liu, aka Steve Liu, a native of China with a PhD in electrical engineering who worked as 
a senior staff engineer for Space & Navigation, a New Jersey-based division of L-3 
Communications, was convicted in the District of New Jersey of exporting sensitive U.S. 
military technology to China, stealing trade secrets and lying to federal agents. The jury 
convicted Liu of nine of 11 counts of an April 5, 2012 second superseding indictment, 
specifically six counts of violating the Arms Export Control Act, one count of possessing 
stolen trade secrets in violation of the Economic Espionage Act, one count of transporting 
stolen property, and one count of lying to federal agents. The jury acquitted Liu on two 
counts of lying to federal agents. According to documents filed in the case and evidence 
presented at trial, in 2010, Liu stole thousands of electronic files from his employer, L-3 
Communications, Space and Navigation Division. The stolen files detailed the 
performance and design of guidance systems for missiles, rockets, target locators, and 
unmanned aerial vehicles. Liu stole the files to position and prepare himself for future 
employment in China. As part of that plan, Liu delivered presentations about the 
technology at several Chinese universities, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and 
conferences organized by Chinese government entities. However, Liu was not charged 
with any crimes related to those presentations. On Nov. 12, 2010, Liu boarded a flight 
from Newark to China. Upon his return to the United States on Nov. 29, 2010, agents 
found Liu in possession of a non-work-issued computer found to contain the stolen 
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material. The following day, Liu lied to ICE agents about the extent of his work on U.S. 
defense technology. The State Department later verified that several of the stolen files on 
Liu’s computer contained technical data that relates to defense items listed on the United 
States Munitions List. The jury also heard testimony that Liu’s company trained him 
about the United States’ export control laws and told him that most of the company’s 
products were covered by those laws. Liu was first arrested on March 8, 2011, in Chicago 
on a complaint in the District of New Jersey charging him with one count of exporting 
defense-related technical data without a license. The investigation was conducted by the 
FBI, ICE and CBP. 
Motorola Trade Secrets to China – On Aug. 29, 2012, Hanjuan Jin, a former 
software engineer for Motorola, was sentenced in the Northern District of Illinois to four 
years in prison for stealing trade secrets from Motorola, specifically Motorola’s 
proprietary iDEN telecommunications technology, for herself and for Sun Kaisens, a 
company that developed products for the Chinese military. According to court documents 
filed in the case, Motorola spent more than $400 million researching and developing 
iDEN technology in just a matter of years. On Feb. 8, 2012, Jin was found guilty of three 
counts of stealing trade secrets. Jin, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in China, possessed 
more than 1,000 electronic and paper Motorola proprietary documents when she was 
stopped by U.S. authorities at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport as she attempted to 
travel to China on Feb. 28, 2007. The judge presiding over the case found her not guilty 
of three counts of economic espionage for the benefit of the government of China and its 
military. According to the evidence at trial, Jin began working for Motorola in 1998, and 
took medical leave in February 2006. Between June and November 2006, while still on 
sick leave, Jin pursued employment in China with Sun Kaisens, a Chinese 
telecommunications firm that developed products for the Chinese military. Between 
November 2006 and February 2007, Jin returned to China and did work for Sun Kaisens 
on projects for the Chinese military. On Feb. 15, 2007, Jin returned to the United States 
from China and reserved a flight to China scheduled to depart on Feb. 28, 2007. Jin 
advised Motorola that she was ready to return to work at Motorola, without informing 
Motorola that she planned to return to China to work for Sun Kaisens. On Feb. 26, 2007, 
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she returned to Motorola, and accessed hundreds of technical documents belonging to 
Motorola on its secure internal computer network. As she attempted to depart from 
Chicago to China, authorities seized numerous materials, some of which provided a 
description of communication feature that Motorola incorporates into its 
telecommunications products. Authorities also recovered classified Chinese documents 
describing telecommunication projects for the Chinese military. Jin was charged with 
theft of trade secrets in an April 1, 2008 indictment. A superseding indictment returned 
on Dec. 9, 2008 charged her with economic espionage. The investigation was conducted 
by the FBI, with assistance from U.S Customs and Border Protection. 
Military Technical Data and Trade Secrets to China – On April 5, 2012, a 
second superseding indictment was returned in the District of New Jersey against Sixing 
Liu, aka “Steve Liu,” a native of China with a Ph.D. in electrical engineering who 
worked as a senior staff engineer for Space & Navigation, a New Jersey-based division of 
L-3 Communications, from March 2009 through Nov. 2010. The superseding indictment 
charged Liu with six counts of illegally exporting defense articles / technical data to 
China, one count of possessing stolen trade secrets, one count of interstate transportation 
of stolen property, and three counts of false statements to federal agents. Liu, of 
Deerfield, Ill., was first arrested on March 8, 2011 in Chicago on a criminal complaint 
filed in the District of New Jersey charging him with one count of exporting defense-
related technical data without a license. At Space & Navigation, Liu allegedly worked on 
precision navigation devices for rocket launchers, missile launch systems, field artillery, 
smart munitions, and other components being used by and prepared for the U.S. 
Department of Defense. Liu was never approved to present information related to Space 
& Navigation’s programs or the technology underlying its programs to any outside 
person or audience. In 2009 and again in 2010, the indictment alleges that Liu traveled to 
China where he attended and delivered presentations on export restricted technical data at 
technology conferences sponsored by Chinese government entities, including the 863 
Program. Before leaving for the 2010 conference in China, Liu allegedly downloaded 
some 36,000 computer files from Space & Navigation to his personal laptop. Upon his 
return to the United States in November 2010, U.S. Customs inspectors found him to be 
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in possession of a laptop computer that contained hundreds of documents related to the 
company’s projects, as well as images of Liu making a presentation at a technology 
conference sponsored by the PRC government. Many of the documents on his computer 
were marked as containing sensitive proprietary company information and/or export-
controlled technical data. The State Department verified that information on the Liu’s 
computer was export-controlled technical data that relates to defense items on the U.S. 
Munitions List. The investigation was conducted by the FBI and ICE. 
DuPont Trade Secrets to China – On March 2, 2012, former DuPont scientist 
Tze Chao pleaded guilty in the Northern District of California to conspiracy to commit 
economic espionage, admitting that he provided trade secrets concerning DuPont’s 
proprietary titanium dioxide manufacturing process to companies he knew were 
controlled by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On Feb. 7, 2012, 
a grand jury in San Francisco returned a superseding indictment charging Chao and four 
other individuals, as well as five companies, with economic espionage and theft of trade 
secrets for their roles in a long-running effort to obtain U.S. trade secrets from DuPont 
for the benefit of companies controlled by the PRC. The five individuals named in the 
indictment were Walter Liew, his wife Christina Liew, Hou Shengdong, Robert 
Maegerle, and Tze Chao. The five companies named as defendants are Pangang Group 
Company Ltd; Pangang Group Steel Vanadium Industry Company Ltd; Pangang Group 
Titanium Industry Company Ltd., Pangang Group International Economic & Trading Co; 
and USA Performance Technology, Inc. According to the superseding indictment, the 
PRC government identified as a priority the development of chloride-route titanium 
dioxide (TiO2) production capabilities. TiO2 is a commercially valuable white pigment 
with numerous uses, including coloring paint, plastics and paper. To achieve that goal, 
companies controlled by the PRC government, specifically the Pangang Group 
companies named in the indictment, and employees of those companies conspired and 
attempted to illegally obtain TiO2 technology that had been developed over many years 
of research and development by DuPont. The Pangang Group companies were aided in 
their efforts by individuals in the United States who had obtained TiO2 trade secrets and 
were willing to sell those secrets for significant sums of money. Defendants Walter Liew, 
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Christina Liew, Robert Maegerle and Tze Chao allegedly obtained and possessed TiO2 
trade secrets belonging to DuPont. Each of these individuals allegedly sold information 
containing DuPont TiO2 trade secrets to the Pangang Group companies for the purpose 
of helping those companies develop large-scale chloride route TiO2 production capability 
in the PRC, including a planned 100,000 ton TiO2 factory at Chongqing, PRC. The 
Liews, USAPTI, and one of its predecessor companies, Performance Group, entered into 
contracts worth in excess of $20 million to convey TiO2 trade secret technology to 
Pangang Group companies. The Liews allegedly received millions of dollars of proceeds 
from these contracts. The proceeds were wired through the United States, Singapore and 
ultimately back into several bank accounts in the PRC in the names of relatives of 
Christina Liew. The object of the defendants’ conspiracy was to convey DuPont’s secret 
chloride-route technology to the PRC companies for the purpose of building modern 
TiO2 production facilities in the PRC without investing in time-consuming and expensive 
research and development. DuPont invented the chloride-route process for manufacturing 
TiO2 in the late-1940s and since then has invested heavily in research and development 
to improve that production process. The global titanium dioxide market has been valued 
at roughly $12 billion, and DuPont has the largest share of that market. This investigation 
was conducted by the FBI. 
Trade Secrets to U.S. Subsidiary of Chinese Company – On Jan. 17, 2012, Yuan 
Li, a former research chemist with the global pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Aventis, 
pleaded guilty in the District of New Jersey to stealing Sanofi’s trade secrets and making 
them available for sale through Abby Pharmatech, Inc., the U.S. subsidiary of a Chinese 
chemicals company. According to court documents, Li worked at Sanofi headquarters in 
Bridgewater, N.J., from August 2006 through June 2011, where she assisted in the 
development of several compounds (trade secrets) that Sanofi viewed as potential 
building blocks for future drugs. While employed at Sanofi, Li was a 50 percent partner 
in Abby, which sells and distributes pharmaceuticals. Li admitted that between Oct. 2008 
and June 2011, she accessed internal Sanofi databases and downloaded information on 
Sanofi compounds and transferred this information to her personal home computer. She 
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also admitted that she made the stolen compounds available for sale on Abby’s website. 
This investigation was conducted by the FBI. 
Dow Trade Secrets to China – On Jan. 12, 2012, Wen Chyu Liu, aka David W. 
Liou, a former research scientist at Dow Chemical Company in Louisiana, was sentenced 
in the Middle District of Louisiana to 60 months in prison, two years supervised release, 
a $25,000 fine and was ordered to forfeit $600,000. Liu was convicted on Feb. 7, 2011 of 
one count of conspiracy to commit trade secret theft for stealing trade secrets from Dow 
and selling them to companies in China, and he was also convicted of one count of 
perjury. According to the evidence presented in court, Liou came to the United States 
from China for graduate work. He began working for Dow in 1965 and retired in 1992. 
Dow is a leading producer of the elastomeric polymer, chlorinated polyethylene (CPE). 
Dow’s Tyrin CPE is used in a number of applications worldwide, such as automotive and 
industrial hoses, electrical cable jackets and vinyl siding. While employed at Dow, Liou 
worked as a research scientist on various aspects of the development and manufacture of 
Dow elastomers, including Tyrin CPE. The evidence at trial established that Liou 
conspired with at least four current and former employees of Dow’s facilities in 
Plaquemine, Louisiana, and in Stade, Germany, who had worked in Tyrin CPE 
production, to misappropriate those trade secrets in an effort to develop and market CPE 
process design packages to Chinese companies. Liou traveled throughout China to market 
the stolen information, and he paid current and former Dow employees for Dow’s CPE-
related material and information. In one instance, Liou bribed a then employee at the 
Plaquemine facility with $50,000 in cash to provide Dow’s process manual and other 
CPE-related information. The investigation was conducted by the FBI. 
Dow and Cargill Trade Secrets to China – On Dec. 21, 2011, Kexue Huang, a 
Chinese national and former resident of Indiana, was sentenced to 87 months 
imprisonment and three years’ supervised release on charges of economic espionage to 
benefit a foreign university tied to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and theft of 
trade secrets. On Oct. 18, 2011, Huang pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Indiana 
to these charges. In July 2010, Huang was charged in the Southern District of Indiana 
with misappropriating and transporting trade secrets to the PRC while working as a 
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research scientist at Dow AgroSciences LLC. On Oct. 18, 2011, a separate indictment in 
the District of Minnesota charging Huang with stealing a trade secret from a second 
company, Cargill Inc., was unsealed. From January 2003 until February 2008, Huang was 
employed as a research scientist at Dow. In 2005, he became a research leader for Dow in 
strain development related to unique, proprietary organic insecticides marketed 
worldwide. Huang admitted that during his employment at Dow, he misappropriated 
several Dow trade secrets. According to plea documents, from 2007 to 2010, Huang 
transferred and delivered the stolen Dow trade secrets to individuals in Germany and the 
PRC. With the assistance of these individuals, Huang used the stolen materials to conduct 
unauthorized research to benefit foreign universities tied to the PRC. Huang also 
admitted that he pursued steps to develop and produce the misappropriated Dow trade 
secrets in the PRC. After Huang left Dow, he was hired in March 2008 by Cargill, an 
international producer and marketer of food, agricultural, financial and industrial 
products and services. Huang worked as a biotechnologist for Cargill until July 2009. 
Huang admitted that during his employment with Cargill, he stole one of the company’s 
trade secrets – a key component in the manufacture of a new food product, which he later 
disseminated to another person, specifically a student at Hunan Normal University in the 
PRC. According to the plea agreement, the aggregated loss from Huang’s conduct 
exceeds $7 million but is less than $20 million. This investigation was conducted by the 
FBI. 
Ford Motor Company Trade Secrets to China – On Nov. 17, 2010, Yu Xiang 
Dong, aka Mike Yu, a product engineer with Ford Motor Company pleaded guilty in the 
Eastern District of Michigan to two counts of theft of trade secrets. According to the plea 
agreement, Yu was a Product Engineer for Ford from 1997 to 2007 and had access to 
Ford trade secrets, including Ford design documents. In December 2006, Yu accepted a 
job at the China branch of a U.S. company. On the eve of his departure from Ford and 
before he told Ford of his new job, Yu copied some 4,000 Ford documents onto an 
external hard drive, including sensitive Ford design documents. Ford spent millions of 
dollars and decades on research, development, and testing to develop and improve the 
design specifications set forth in these documents. On Dec. 20, 2006, Yu traveled to the 
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location of his new employer in Shenzhen, China, taking the Ford trade secrets with him. 
On Jan. 2, 2007, Yu emailed his Ford supervisor from China and informed him that he 
was leaving Ford’s employ. In Nov. 2008, Yu began working for Beijing Automotive 
Company, a direct competitor of Ford. On Oct. 19, 2009, Yu returned to the U.S. Upon 
his arrival, he was arrested. At that time, Yu had in his possession his Beijing Automotive 
Company laptop computer. Upon examination of that computer, the FBI discovered that 
41 Ford system design specifications documents had been copied to the defendant’s 
Beijing Automotive Company work computer. The FBI also discovered that each of 
those design documents had been accessed by Yu during the time of his employment with 
Beijing Automotive Company. Yu was ultimately sentenced to 70 months in prison in 
April 2011. This case was investigated by the FBI. 
DuPont Trade Secrets to China – On Oct. 26, 2010, Hong Meng, a former 
research chemist for DuPont, was sentenced in the District of Delaware to 14 months in 
prison and $58,621 in restitution for theft of trade secrets. Meng pleaded guilty on June 8, 
2010. Meng was involved in researching Organic Light Emitting Diodes (OLED) during 
his tenure at DuPont. In early 2009, DuPont’s OLED research efforts resulted in the 
development of a breakthrough chemical process (trade secret) that increased the 
performance and longevity of OLED displays. In the Spring of 2009, while still 
employed at DuPont and without DuPont’s permission or knowledge, Meng accepted 
employment as a faculty member at Peking University (PKU) College of Engineering, 
Department of Nanotechnology in Beijing, China, and thereafter began soliciting funding 
to commercialize his OLED research at PKU. In June 2009, he emailed to his PKU 
account the protected chemical process from DuPont. He also downloaded the chemical 
process from his DuPont work computer to a thumb drive which he uploaded to his 
personal computer. In August 2009, he mailed a package containing 109 samples of 
DuPont intermediate chemical compounds to a colleague at Northwestern University and 
instructed his colleague at Northwestern to forward the materials to Meng’s office at 
PKU. Eight of the 109 samples were trade secret chemical compounds. Meng also made 
false statements to the FBI when questioned about these samples. This investigation was 
conducted by the FBI. 
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GM Trade Secrets to China – On July 22, 2010, an indictment returned in the 
Eastern District of Michigan charging Yu Qin and his wife Shanshan Du, both of Troy, 
Michigan, was unsealed. The indictment charged the defendants with conspiracy to 
possess trade secrets without authorization, unauthorized possession of trade secrets and 
wire fraud. According to the indictment, from December 2003 through May 2006, the 
defendants conspired to possess trade secret information of General Motors Company 
relating to hybrid vehicles, knowing that the information had been stolen, converted, or 
obtained without authorization. The indictment alleges that Du, while employed with 
GM, provided GM trade secret information relating to hybrid vehicles to her husband, 
Qin, for his benefit and for the benefit of a company, Millennium Technology 
International Inc. (MTI), which the defendants owned and operated. Five days after Du 
was offered a severance agreement by GM in January 2005, she copied thousands of GM 
documents, including trade secret documents, to a computer hard drive used for MTI 
business. A few months later, Qin moved forward on a new business venture to provide 
hybrid vehicle technology to Chery Automobile, a Chinese automotive manufacturer 
based in China and a competitor of GM. The indictment further alleges that in May 2006, 
the defendants possessed GM trade secret information without authorization on several 
computer and electronic devices located in their residence. Based on preliminary 
calculations, GM estimates that the value of the stolen GM documents is over $40 
million. This investigation was conducted by the FBI. 
Economic Espionage / Theft of Space Shuttle and Rocket Secrets for China – 
On Feb. 11, 2010 former Rockwell and Boeing engineer Dongfan “Greg” Chung was 
sentenced to 188 months imprisonment and three years’ supervised release after his July 
16, 2009 conviction in the Central District of California. Chung was convicted of charges 
of economic espionage and acting as an illegal agent of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), for whom he stole restricted technology and Boeing trade secrets, including 
information related to the Space Shuttle program and the Delta IV rocket. According to 
the judge’s ruling, Chung served as an illegal agent of China for more than 30 years and 
kept more than 300,000 pages of documents reflecting Boeing trade secrets stashed in his 
home as part of his mission of steal aerospace and military trade secrets from Boeing to 
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assist the Chinese government. Chung sent Boeing trade secrets to the PRC via the mail, 
via sea freight, via the Chinese consulate in San Francisco, and via a Chinese agent 
named Chi Mak. On several occasions, Chung also used the trade secrets that he 
misappropriated from Boeing to prepare detailed briefings that he later presented to 
Chinese officials in the PRC. Chung was originally arrested on Feb. 11, 2008, in 
Southern California after being indicted on eight counts of economic espionage, one 
count of conspiracy to commit economic espionage, one count of acting as an 
unregistered foreign agent, one count of obstruction of justice, and three counts of 
making false statements to the FBI. The investigation was conducted by the FBI and 
NASA. 
Illegal Export of Military Technology / Money Laundering / Illegal 
Communication of Classified Information for China–On Aug. 9, 2010, following six 
days of deliberation after a trial spanning nearly four months in Honolulu, a federal jury 
found Noshir S. Gowadia guilty of five criminal offenses relating to his design for the 
PRC of a low-signature cruise missile exhaust system capable of rendering a PRC cruise 
missile resistant to detection by infrared missiles. He was sentenced late yesterday to 32 
years in prison for communicating classified national defense information to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), illegally exporting military technical data, as well as money 
laundering, filing false tax returns and other offenses. The jury also convicted Gowadia in 
three counts of illegally communicating classified information regarding lock-on range 
for infrared missiles against the U.S. B-2 bomber to persons not authorized to receive 
such information. The B-2 bomber is one of America’s most critical defense assets, 
capable of utilizing its stealth characteristics to penetrate enemy airspace and deliver 
precision guided weapons on multiple targets. Gowadia was also convicted of unlawfully 
exporting classified information about the B-2, illegally retaining information related to 
U.S. national defense at his home, money laundering and filing false tax returns for the 
years 2001 and 2002. According to information produced during the trial, Gowadia was 
an engineer with Northrop Grumman Corporation from approximately 1968 to 1986, 
during which time he contributed to the development of the unique propulsion system 
and low observable capabilities of the B-2 Spirit bomber, sometimes referred to as the 
 93 
“Stealth” bomber. Gowadia also continued to work on classified matters as a contractor 
with the with the U.S. government until 1997, when his security clearance was 
terminated. Evidence at the trial revealed that from July 2003 to June 2005, Gowadia 
took six trips to the PRC to provide defense services in the form of design, test support 
and test data analysis of technologies for the purpose of assisting the PRC with a cruise 
missile system by developing a stealthy exhaust nozzle. At the time of his arrest, 
Gowadia had been paid at least $110,000 by the PRC. The jury convicted Gowadia of 
two specific transmissions of classified information: a PowerPoint presentation on the 
exhaust nozzle of a PRC cruise missile project and an evaluation of the effectiveness of a 
redesigned nozzle, and a computer file providing his signature prediction of a PRC cruise 
missile outfitted with his modified exhaust nozzle and associated predictions in relation 
to a U.S. air-to-air missile. This case was investigated by FBI, the U.S. Air Force Office 
of Special Investigations, the IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the State 
Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. 
Theft of Computer Trade Secrets for China – September 19, 2012, Chunlai 
Yang, a former senior software engineer for Chicago-based CME Group, Inc., pleaded 
guilty to theft of trade secrets for stealing computer source code and other proprietary 
information while at the same time pursuing plans to improve an electronic trading 
exchange in China. Yang admitted to downloading more than 10,000 files between late 
2010, and June 30, 2011, containing CME computer source code that made up a 
substantial part of the operating systems for the Globex electronic trading platform. The 
government maintains that the potential loss was between $50 million and $100 million, 
while Yang maintains that the potential loss was less than $55.7 million. According to the 
plea agreement, Yang began working for CME Group in 2000 and was a senior software 
engineer at the time of his arrest. His responsibilities included writing computer code 
and, because of his position, he had access to the software programs that supported the 
Globex electronic trading platform, which allowed market participants to buy and sell 
CME Group products from any place at any time. The source code and algorithms that 
made up the supporting programs were proprietary and confidential business property of 
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CME Group, which instituted internal measures to safeguard and protect its trade secrets. 
Yang also admitted that he and two unnamed business partners developed plans to form a 
business referred to as the Tongmei (Gateway to America) Futures Exchange Software 
Technology Company (Gateway), whose purpose was to increase the trading volume at 
the Zhangjiagang, China, chemical electronic trading exchange (the Zhangjiagang 
Exchange.) The Zhangjiagang Exchange was to become a transfer station to China for 
advanced technologies companies around the world. Yang expected that Gateway would 
provide the exchange with technology through written source code to allow for high 
trading volume, high trading speeds, and multiple trading functions. To help the China 
exchange attract more customers and generate higher profits, Gateway proposed to 
expand the Zhangjiagang Exchange’s software by providing customers with more ways 
of placing orders; connecting the exchange database’s storage systems and matching 
systems; rewriting the trading system software in the JAVA computer programming 
language; raising the system’s capacity and speed by modifying communication lines and 
structures; and developing trading software based on the FIX computer coding language.  
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